Essays in the microeconometric evaluation of public policies by Zilio, Federico
Essays in the microeconometric
evaluation of public policies
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Economics
by
Federico Zilio
Institute for Social and Economic Research
University of Essex
October 2017

Declarations
No part of this thesis has been submitted for another degree.
Chapter 1 is co-authored with Professor Tom Crossley. Chapter 3 is co-authored with
Professor Mike Brewer and Professor Tom Crossley. Chapter 2 is exclusively mine.
Chapter 1 has been previously published in the ISER Working Paper Series (No.
2017-10, August, 2017).

Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council for the financial support
that made writing this thesis possible.
A special thanks to my supervisors, Prof. Mike Brewer and Prof. Tom Crossley, for
their daily availability, precious advice, continuous support and strong motivation. I
have learned from them a lot and hope to learn more in the future. Thanks to them
I have grown as a researcher and as a person. I feel very lucky to have worked with
them.
Thanks to ISER for providing me the facilities and all the people working here for
giving me help when I needed.
Thanks to all my office-mates, Catalina, Ipek, Yamil, Claudia, Caroline, Mario, Josh,
Franco, Victor, for bearing me all the time and making coffee breaks such special
moments. I think we are more than an office, we are a group of friends.
Thanks to all the friends I made here in Colchester for all the pleasant discussions and
moments. A special thanks to Greta & Adam, Emil, Duygu, Chrysa & Kostas, Elisa
& Federico, Alex & Gulcimen, and all the friends at ISER, Department of Economics
and Department of Sociology.
Thanks to my family and all my Italian friends. I know that when I go back to Italy
I can always count on you and on a warm environment.

Summary
Chapter 1 examines the health benefits of the Winter Fuel Payment (WFP), an
unconditional but labelled cash transfer given to elderly people above the female
state pension age with the stated intent of help to deal with heating costs. We
exploit the eligibility age cut-off to estimate the causal effect of the WFP on self-
reports of chest infection, measured hypertension and biomarkers of infection and
inflammation, such as C-reactive protein and fibrinogen. We find a robust reduction
in the incidence of high levels of serum fibrinogen and some evidence of reductions
in other disease markers that point to health benefits.
In Chapter 2, we estimate the incidence of the housing subsidy on subsidised and
unsubsidised tenants. Using a reform of the housing subsidies in the UK, we inves-
tigate how the exogenous cut in the subsidy affected rents. We find that rents were
not significantly reduced by the subsidy cut and the incidence mostly fell on tenants.
These findings suggest that the rental market was not originally segmented between
subsidised and unsubsidised tenants and the fall in the demand of subsidised tenants
was offset by the recent expansion of the private rental market.
In Chapter 3, we revisit and offer a reassessment of the literature on the impact of UK
National Minimum Wage on employment. We highlight that this literature has em-
ployed difference-in-difference designs, which have significant challenges in conducting
appropriate inference and very low power when inference is conducted appropriately.
In addition, the literature has focused on the binary outcome of statistical rejection
of the null hypothesis, without attention to the range of employment effects. In our
reanalysis of the data, we find that the data are consistent with both large nega-
tive and small positive impacts of the UK National Minimum Wage on employment
offering little guidance to policy makers.
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Introduction
In the financial year 2016/17 the United Kingdom (UK) spent £216.1 billion on
welfare. This is around 11.5 % of the Gross Domestic Product and 28.7 % of the
Total Managed Expenditure (Department for Work and Pension, Benefit expenditure
and caseload tables 2017). In times of austerity it is very important that policy makers
know whether welfare spending achieves the intended goals. It is also important to
know whether welfare policies have unintended consequences. The scope of policy
evaluation is to answer these questions and this is why it has become increasingly
influential among governments. Policy evaluation literature has developed several
methods to estimate the causal effects of public policies. In this thesis we work with
three of the most common methods of this literature: regression discontinuity design,
instrumental variables and difference-in-differences design. We use the methods to
evaluate three policies that aim to improve health, housing and employment, three
areas that have a big impact on people’s well-being. The policy studied in Chapter 1
is the programme known as Winter Fuel Payment (WFP), a cash transfer to elderly
people in the UK that costs taxpayers around £2 billion a year. In Chapter 2, we
analyse housing subsidies in the UK, on which the UK government spends around
£24 billion a year. The third policy is the UK’s national minimum wage, one of the
policies to increase the wage of low-paid workers.
The health of elderly people is a primary concern of all governments. The UK spent
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around £133 billion in the financial year 2015/16 on healthcare services (HM Trea-
sury, Country and regional analysis: 2016) and more than two fifths of this expendi-
ture was allocated to people aged 65 or older (Nuffield Trust estimates in Robineau,
The Guardian, February 1st 2016). Every year, the UK experiences Excess Winter
Mortality (EWM) and faces a rise in the demand of care in winter among the elderly.
Notably, the UK experiences a higher level of EWM than Scandinavian countries
where winters are notoriously harsher. While outdoor temperatures play a decisive
role to explain EWM, living in a cold house has a direct impact on the health of
elderly people. In the UK, a key policy response to EWM and diseases associated
with cold temperatures is the Winter Fuel Payment (WFP), a labelled but uncondi-
tional cash transfer to households containing a member aged above the female state
pension age. From 2000 to 2009, the WFP was received by households containing
an older person above age 60. Previous work has shown that the WFP raises fuel
spending among eligible households. In Chapter 1, we study the causal effects of
the WFP on health outcomes associated with the main causes of EWM: cardiovas-
cular and respiratory diseases. The outcomes we examine are self-reports of chest
infection, measured hypertension, and two biomarkers of infection and inflamma-
tion (fibrinogen and C-reactive protein). To estimate the causal effect of the WFP,
we use two cross-sectional studies, the Health Survey for England and the Scottish
Health Survey, and a longitudinal study, the English Longitudinal Study of Aging.
We then employ a regression discontinuity design by comparing our health outcomes
just below and above the 60 year old eligibility cut-off. Our regression discontinuity
design estimates the causal effect of the WFP on the health of individuals living in
households where the oldest member of the household is just over 60 years old. We
find a robust and statistically significant reduction in the incidence of high concen-
tration of fibrinogen, one of the biomarkers of infection. Reductions in other health
outcomes also point to health benefits from the WFP programme, but the effects are
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less precisely estimated.
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that everyone should have
the right to a suitable living standard, and housing is recognised as one of the basic
needs that ensures citizens an adequate well-being. Housing subsidies are one of the
policies that aim to make housing affordable. However, the standard theory predicts
that when a housing subsidy is in place, the housing demand shifts upwards and,
unless the supply is perfectly elastic, rents rise for all tenants regardless of whether
they receive a housing subsidy. This change in rents implies that the incidence of
the housing subsidies is shared between tenants and landlords. In Chapter 2 we
study the incidence of housing subsidies by examining how they affect subsidised
and unsubsidised tenants. We exploit a reform implemented in 2011 in the UK that
reduced housing subsidies for around 1.5 million claimants. Our analysis uses the
exogenous cut in the housing subsidies as an instrument to address the endogeneity of
subsidy receipt. The main contribution of this chapter is the link between the effects
of the subsidy cut on subsidy recipients and the housing demand of unsubsidised
tenants. Using data from the Family Resource Survey and the English Housing
Survey, we find that the subsidy cut did not significantly reduce rents for subsidised
tenants and there was no spillover effect on rents paid by unsubsidised tenants.
Beside adequate housing, one of the basic principles recognised in the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is the right to work with a fair remuneration that
ensures a suitable living standard. In the UK this is a highly discussed topic based
on the perception that a share of the working population does not earn enough to
afford a decent living standard. One of the key policies in response to this concern is
the National Minimum Wage (NMW) that was first introduced in 1999. Interestingly,
successive UK governments’ approach to setting the NMW has been evidence-based.
A statutory and independent body, the Low Pay Commission (LPC), commissions
and funds research on the impacts of the NMW, and then uses this evidence when
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making its recommendations to government. A substantial body of research on NMW
has concluded that the NMW did not have a detrimental effect on employment, and,
in the light of this, successive governments have subsequently uprated the NMW and
recently introduced the National Living Wage. We revisit and reassess the literature
on the employment effect of the NMW on the basis of two concerns. First, much of
the literature uses a difference-in-difference strategy, although there are challenges
in conducting appropriate inference in such designs, and they can have very low
power when inference is conducted appropriately. Second, the literature has focused
on the statistical rejection of the null hypothesis of “no employment effect of the
NMW”, with no attention to the range of employment effects that are consistent
with the data. In our reanalysis of the data, we conduct difference-in-difference
inference using recent suggestions for best practice, and focus on confidence intervals
rather than the binary outcome of whether the null hypothesis of no employment
effects can be rejected. We also report job retention and employment elasticities and
calculate the Minimum Detectable Effects, the minimum employment effect size we
are able to detect with high probability. We find that the data are consistent with
both large negative and small positive effects of the UK National Minimum Wage on
employment, and so conclude that existing evidence in fact offers little guidance to
policy makers.
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Chapter 1
The Health Benefits of a Targeted
Cash Transfer: The UK Winter
Fuel Payment
1.1 Introduction
Each year, the U.K. experiences Excess Winter Mortality (EWM). The Office of
National Statistics computes EWM by comparing the number of deaths registered
between December and March with the average number of deceases in the foregoing
August-November and in the succeeding April-July. In 2014/15 the number of excess
winter deaths in England and Wales was estimated at 43,900, the highest level since
1999. EWM has also been documented in Europe (Kunst et al., 1993; Eng and
Mercer, 1998; Rose, 1966; Mackenbach et al., 1992; Keatinge and Donaldson, 1995),
the USA (Kloner et al., 1999; Lanska and Hoffmann, 1999) and Asia (Cheng, 1993;
Ornato et al., 1990). Most EWM occurs among the elderly and is due to respiratory
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and circulatory diseases (Donaldson, 2010; Lloyd, 2013; ONS Statistical Bulletin
2014/15). 1 In addition to EWM, cold weather is associated with increased demands
on health care systems through increased incidence of illness requiring hospitalization
or other treatment.
While outdoor temperatures may play a role in EWM, 2 living in a cold indoor
environment has a direct impact on the health of elderly people (Wilkinson et al.
2001; Marmot et al. 2011; Dear & McMichael 2011; Rudge & Gilchrist 2007). 3
In the U.K., a key policy response to EWM is the Winter Fuel Payment (WFP).
The WFP is a labelled but unconditional cash transfer to households containing an
older person (male or female) above the female state pension age. The stated intent
of the policy is help the elderly deal with the cost of keeping their dwelling warm
(Lloyd, 2013; Kennedy & Parkin, 2016) and the labelling of this cash transfer has
been shown to be effective in inducing eligible households to increase fuel spending
(Beatty, Blow, Crossley, & O’Dea, 2014). 4 However, the key policy question is
whether the WFP improves health of elderly people living in eligible households, and
there is little evidence on this point.
The female state pension age, and hence the age cut-off for WFP eligibility, was 60
prior to 2010. It then began to increase so that it will equal the male state pension
age of 65 in 2018 and then both will rise to 67 by 2028. Most EWM occurs among
1In the winter of 2014/2015 36 % of EWM was attributable to respiratory disease and 22.5 %
to cardiovascular disease (ONS, 2015).
2The strong association between exposure to outdoor cold temperatures and mortality or mor-
bidity is well documented in the epidemiological literature (Curwen, 1997; Wilkinson et al., 2001;
Keatinge, 1986, 1989, 2002).
3Wilkinson, Landon, Armstrong, Stevenson, and McKee (2001) show that deaths attributable
to cardiovascular diseases are 23 % higher in winter than the rest of the year and give evidence
of a positive association of the EWM with the age of the property and the thermal inefficiency
of the buildings. Rudge and Gilchrist (2007) find that their fuel poverty index which includes an
energy efficiency rates and income is a strong predictor of the excess winter morbidity measured
with number of emergency respiratory hospital admissions.
4Beatty et al. (2014) estimate that eligible households spend 47 % of their WFP on fuel. If the
payment were treated as other income, eligible household would be expected to spend 3 % of the
payment on fuel.
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individuals over 75, leading Lloyd (2013) to propose that increases in the eligibility
age could reduce the financial cost of the WFP with minimal if any reduction in
health benefits. But there has been no direct evidence on the health benefits foregone
through recent increases in the age cut-off or health benefits that may be lost through
further increases.
This paper reports the first tests for health benefits of the WFP based on individual-
level data. We measure health outcomes in the Health Surveys for England (HSE),
the Scottish Health Survey (SHeS) and the English Longitudinal Study on Ageing
(ELSA). These studies include nurse visits allowing us study biomarkers and physical
measures as well self-reports. To estimate the causal effect of the WFP, we follow
Beatty et al. (2014) in employing a regression discontinuity design (RDD). The RDD
is thought to be one of the most convincing of quasi-experimental designs (Lee &
Lemieux, 2010). 5 A RDD is possible where there is cut-off in eligibility for treatment,
as there is for the WFP: in the period we study, households with no member 60 or
above are ineligible. In addition, take up of the WFP is very high, so that there
is little difference between eligibility and receipt. 6 A RDD estimates the causal
effect of treatment by comparing outcomes just below and above the eligibility cut-
off. It estimates a local average treatment effect - at the eligibility cut-off. Thus
our design estimates the causal effect of the WFP on the health of individuals living
in households where the oldest member of the household is 61. These are precisely
the individuals who lost any health benefits of the WFP as the eligibility age was
incrementally increased from 2010, so our empirical strategy directly answers a key
policy question.
To the best of our knowledge, Iparraguirre (2014) is the only prior assessment of
5The Regression Discontinuity Design was first introduced in the Education literature (see
Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960)) and has been widely adopted in economics (Lee & Lemieux,
2010)
6See Beatty et al. (2014) for further discussion.
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the health benefits of the WFP. Using aggregate mortality data, Iparraguirre (2014)
documents a decline in EWM in 2000/2001, coincident with the introduction of the
universal WFP. EWM fluctuates significantly from year-to-year with changing winter
weather conditions and viral environment. Using time-series econometric techniques,
Iparraguirre (2014) finds a structural break in the EWM time series for England and
Wales in 2000/2001 and estimates that half of the reduction in the EWM in that year
can be attributed to the introduction of the WFP. 7 This is an important finding, but
it does rest on the ability of the econometric methods to distinguish the policy effects
from the very substantial year-on-year fluctuations in EWM. Moreover, the aggregate
EWM time-series is necessarily silent on health effects that may precede mortality,
and on benefits to particular groups. We add to the evidence base significantly by us-
ing a convincing quasi-experimental design in conjunction with individual level data;
by considering a variety of measures of circulatory and respiratory illness, including
biomarkers 8; and by testing for health benefits particularly among the group that
have been made ineligible by recent changes to the age cut off.
We estimate the effect of the WFP on circulatory and respiratory illness measured
four ways:
(i) self-reports of chest infection in the last 3 weeks
(ii) hypertension measured during a visit
(iii) serum values of C-reactive protein (CRP) in excess of 10 mg/l
(iv) serum values of Fibrinogen in excess of 4 g/l.
Repeated exposure to a cold environment results in an increase in the blood pres-
7The WFP was introduced in 1997 but it was initially means-tested and the payment significantly
smaller. In 2000/2001 it took its current form (a universal payment to all households containing a
person above the female state pension age of between 200 and 300 pounds).
8Biomarkers have been increasingly drawing attention in the economic literature as an objective
measure of health and a complement of self-reported health measures (see Ju¨rges et al., 2013; Evans
and Garthwaite, 2014; Michaud et al., 2016)
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sure, and high values of systolic and/or diastolic blood pressure (hypertension) is a
predictor of heart disease and stroke (Hoffman et al. 1983; Fraser 1986; Wilson et
al. 1998; Collins et al., 1985; Collins et al., 1990). CRP is a blood plasma protein
that is indicative of inflammation and infection and a risk predictor of cardiovascular
disease (Pepys, 2003; Pearson et al., 2003). Fibrinogen is glyco-protein and marker
of inflammation. It is strongly associated with exacerbations of chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease (Duvoix et al., 2012; Mannino et al., 2015). High values of CRP
or fibrinogen are considered evidence of current infection (Pearson et al., 2003).
Our principal finding is that, among those living in a household that just qualifies for
the payment, the WFP leads to a six percentage point reduction in the incidence of
high levels of serum fibrinogen (on a base of 12 %). This effect is statistical significant
(p < 0.01) and very robust. For the other health measures we consider, while point
estimates suggest health benefits, the estimated effects are less robust to changes in
sample or specification, and rarely statistically significant.
In the next section, we provide further detail on our data, outcomes measures, iden-
tification strategy and methods. Section 3 presents our results. Section 4 contains
additional discussion of the findings.
1.2 Data and Methods
1.2.1 Data
The analysis reported in this paper is based on data from the Health Surveys for
England (HSE) (2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2009) 9 , the Scottish Health
Survey (SHeS) (2003, 2008, 2009) and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing
9HSE 2001 contains hypertension measure and self-reports of chest infection only (not the
biomarkers).
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(ELSA) (wave 2, 2004-05, and wave 4, 2008-09). The HSE and the SHeS are annual
cross-sectional surveys of the health conditions of the population in England and
Scotland. ELSA is a longitudinal survey that captures the population in England
aged 50 and over. The ELSA sample is derived from the 1998, 1999 and 2001 HSE.
In the surveys a face-to-face interview is followed by a nurse visit. The sample
design of HSE, SHeS and ELSA is at household level. A face-to-face interview is
followed by a nurse visit for all members of the household. 10 In the interview the
respondents answer questions on their general health, smoking status and alcohol
consumption and other individual characteristics such as education and employment
status. After the interview an appointment for the nurse visit is arranged. In the
visit a trained nurse asks questions on the health condition of the respondent, takes
blood and saliva samples and reads the blood pressure and several other measures
(height, weight, waist, hip, lung function and grip strength). Blood samples are sent
to an external laboratory for analysis. ELSA, HSE and SHeS data contain several
biomarkers that are recovered from the analysis of the blood samples. Among the
biomarkers reported, there are two that are useful for our analysis because they are
correlated with inflammation processes and infection and are markers of circulatory
and respiratory illness. These are C-reactive and fibrinogen.
Following Beatty et al. (2014) we restrict the sample to single men and couples in
which the man is the oldest in the household. Over the period 2003-2009 the Female
State Pension age was 6011, coincident with the age of eligibility for the WFP. We
discard single women and couples in which the woman is the oldest member of the
household to avoid any confounding effect of receipt of the state pension on the fuel
expenditure and the health outcomes of the elderly.12
10We study the WFP effect on health of individuals. In this paper, we do not exploit the fact
that we have data for individuals of the same household and do not estimate the spillover effects of
the WFP.
11In the same period the male state pension age was 65.
12Our findings are not confounded by any other policy directed at elderly people. Free flu
10
1.2.2 Health Outcomes
We study four measures of circulatory and respiratory illness:
(i) self-reports of chest infection in the last 3 weeks
(ii) hypertension measured during a visit
(iii) serum values of C-reactive protein (CRP) in excess of 10 mg/l
(iv) serum values of Fibrinogen in excess of 4 g/l.
During the nurse visit, respondents are asked whether they have experienced any
respiratory infection in the preceding 3 weeks (influenza, pneumonia, bronchitis or a
severe cold). This self-reported outcome is available only in ELSA and SHeS.
Our second outcome is hypertension, a risk factor for strokes and heart attacks. The
World Health Organization (WHO) defines hypertension as systolic blood pressure of
140 mm Hg or above and/or diastolic blood pressure of 90 mm Hg or above (WHO,
2013). In our sample, around the cut-off age for WFP eligibility, about 35 % of
respondents are hypertensive.
The other outcomes in our study are CRP and fibrinogen, two acute-phase biomark-
ers. Serum concentrations of these two biomarkers increase sharply during an inflam-
matory process. CRP is considered an indicator of bacterial infection, pneumonia
and tissue damage (Tillet and Francis, 1930; Pepys, 2003; Pearson et al., 2003; Si-
mon et al., 2004). The median of CRP in our sample is 1.7 mg/l but its distribution
is highly skewed. The value rises within few hours of disease onset. Inflammation and
bacterial infection can produce a rise in CRP values up to 1,000-fold (Pepys, 2003;
Gruys et al., 2005). Fibrinogen is a coagulation protein produced by the liver that
helps the body in the formation of blood clots. The normal range of fibrinogen is 2-4
vaccination is offered to elderly aged 65 or over (Department of Health, 2000).
11
g/l, but the concentration increases up to 3-fold in the presence of an inflammatory
process, infection or tissue damage (Fenger-Eriksen et al., 2008; Gruys et al., 2005;
Schmaier, 2012). High concentrations of fibrinogen are also strongly associated with
chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases and moderately with coronary heart diseases
(Danesh et al., 2005; Duvoix et al., 2012; Mannino et al., 2015). In the epidemio-
logical literature a value of the C-reactive protein in excess of 10 mg/l is taken as
evidence that a person has an active infection or inflammatory process. Epidemiolo-
gists have often discarded observations with these high values because of their focus
on chronic processes (Pearson et al., 2003). However, as our interest is whether the
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics. C-reactive protein, Fibrinogen, Hypertension and
Self-Reported Chest Infection.
Age Window Median 90th percentile Prob(Illness)
C-reactive protein
Prob(CRP > 10mg/l)
58-63 1.7 7 0.055
Fibrinogen
Prob(Fib ≥ 4g/l)
58-63 3.1 4 0.125
Hypertension
Prob(Hypertension)
58-63 - - 0.353
Self-reported Chest Infection
Prob(ChestInfection)
58-63 - - 0.101
Sample is pooled data from the English Longitudinal Study of Aging, Health Survey
for England and Scottish Health Survey.
Observations with a fractional probability of being eligible to the Winter Fuel Payment
are dropped.
WFP plays a role in reducing the incidence of a respiratory or circulatory disease
among the elderly, extreme values (in excess of 10 mg/l for CRP) are the appropriate
object of our analysis. The epidemiological literature has not defined an equivalent
disease threshold for fibrinogen but we take values in excess of the top the standard
range (2-4 g/l) as evidence of current infection or inflammation.
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1.2.3 Regression Discontinuity Design
The RDD allows health outcomes to vary with the “forcing variable”, which is the
age of the oldest person in the household of subject i at the time of the interview t.
13 Denote this by (Ait). The econometric model includes smooth functions of the
value of the forcing variable relative to the cut-off age (Ait − 60). It also includes
an indicator (or dummy) variable, Dit, for whether a respondent’s household was
eligible for the last WFP payment before the interview at which health outcomes
were measured. Finally, it includes additional covariates Xit, to increase the precision
of the estimator by capturing individual background variation in health (unrelated
to the WFP). 14 As covariates we use individual characteristics (type of household,
gender, smoker status, alcohol consumption , education, income, employment status),
anthropometric measurements (Body Mass Index, waist), survey-wave dummies and
month of nurse visit. In particular, including month of nurse visit is important
because the incidence of illnesses is higher in winter months than in summer months.
Thus the econometric model is:
Hit = β0 + f(Ait − 60) + τDit + f(Ait − 60) ·Dit +Xitγ + it (1.1)
13In health economics, Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) use age as forcing variable in a RDD setting
to estimate the effect of the minimum drinking age on mortality.
14The assumption behind the RDD is that all health determinants apart from WFP eligibility
should evolve smoothly with Ait, including (but not limited to) the covariates Xit. For the covariates
Zi, we can test this by estimating an RDD in Zi. There should be no discontinuity in the Zi at the
60 or, equivalently, observables should be balanced between eligible and not eligible in the region of
the cut-off (analogous to covariate balance in a randomized trial). We have tested this and cannot
reject for balance for any of the included covariates Zi (see the notes in Table 1.2 for a complete
list). The major concern here is that we can find a discontinuity in employment status at the age of
60 since the WFP eligibility cut-off is coincident with the female state pension age. For our sample
of single men and couples in which the men is the oldest the WFP effect on employment status is
0.001 (-0.098; 0.100). This implies that the point estimate of the treatment effect is not affected by
employment status. Our robustness checks confirm that covariates do not bias our estimates. The
inclusion of employment status and other covariates can, however, improve precision by reducing
the unexplained variation in the outcome variable (again, as in a randomized trial).
13
We employ both linear and quadratic functions for f( ). The model is estimated by
ordinary least squares. Note that all of the health measures (Hit) we consider are
binary so that E[Hit] = Prob(Hit = 1) and this is a linear probability model. The
parameter of interest is τ , which measures the local causal effect of the WFP on
Prob(Hit = 1), around the cutoff. Formally:
τ = lim
A↓60
E[Hit|Ait = 60, Xit = x]− lim
A↑60
E[Hit|Ait = 60, Xit = x] (1.2)
As the Hit are measures of illness, if the WFP improves health τ should be negative.
We report standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering by the
age in years of the oldest member of respondent’s household. 15
The WFP was between £200 and £300 (about 300-450 USD) during the period
2002-2009 when our data were collected and it was paid in November-December. 16
Eligibility is determined by the age of the old household member in the preceding
September. Thus a respondent’s household will have received a WFP in the December
prior to the nurse visit date only if the oldest member of the household was 60 in the
September immediately before the December before that date. All households with
an oldest member aged 59 or less at the date of the nurse visit will not have received a
WFP. All households with an oldest member aged 62 or more at the date of the nurse
visit will have been eligible for at least one WFP, and, given the very high take-up of
this benefit, almost surely received it. For households with an oldest member aged 60
or 61, whether they have been eligible for a WFP will depend on both the date of the
nurse visit and the birthday of the oldest member of the household. A complication is
15We follow the discussion in Cameron and Miller (2015) and cluster standard errors at age of the
oldest member level rather than household level because we would otherwise assume independence
across households with same age of the oldest member. However, in the analysis we do not apply
standard error corrections to account for small number of clusters.
16From 2000 to 2007 the WFP was £200 for most eligible households but £300 for households
with an over-80s member. In 2008 the WFP was temporarily uplifted to £250 for over 60s and to
£400 for over 80s but this increase was reversed in the Budget of March 2011.
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that, although the month of the nurse visit is known, ages are recorded in the data in
years. That means, the WFP status of some households with an oldest member aged
60 or 61 can only be determined probabilistically. This is described in Table A1 in
the Appendix A1. 17 We deal with this in two ways. First, we define Dit according to
Table A1, so that Dit = 0 if Ait < 59, Dit = 1 if Ait > 61 and Dit ∈ [0, 1/12, 2/12, ...1]
if Ait ∈ [60, 61] following the mapping in Table A1. Second, as a robustness check, we
re-estimate the model dropping all observations for which WFP cannot be discretely
determined. Note that when these cases are dropped, Dit = 1[Ait > 60] (exactly),
where 1[.] is an indicator function.
1.3 Results
We begin with the now standard graphical presentation of the RDD in Figures 1
through 4. Each figure corresponds to one of our four measures of circulatory and
respiratory illness. The vertical axis measures the incidence of illness, after regression-
adjustment for covariates at the individual level. These covariates are listed in the
notes to the figure but of course exclude age and WFP eligibility. The horizontal axis
measures the age of the oldest member of a respondent’s household. Each plotted
point is the average value of the illness measure for a given year of age (of oldest
household member). As our illness measures are binary, this mean is a probability.
The cut-off for WFP eligibility (at age 61) is indicated in Figures 1 through 4 by the
vertical line and separate least-squares best-fit lines are plotted to the left and the
right of the cut-off. A treatment effect is indicated by a discontinuity between these
17For example, if an individual has the nurse visit in January, their household will have received
a WFP in December (one month before), as long as the oldest member is more than 60 years
and 4 months old, so that they were 60 in the preceding September. If the oldest member of the
household reports age 60 and was born in August, the household will have been eligible for a WFP in
December. However, if the oldest member of the household reports age 60 and was born in October,
the household will not have been eligible for a WFP in December. Of those oldest members of a
household aged 60 in years at a given nurse visit, 2/3 will be older than 60 years and 4months, and
1/3 will be 60 years four months or less.
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Figure 1.1: Effect of the Winter Fuel Payment on the probability of having a C-
reactive protein level larger than 10 mg/l.
 
Figure 1.1 plots the residuals of a regression of the Prob(CRP > 10mg/l) on type
of household, gender, smoker status, alcohol consumption Body Mass Index, waist,
education, income, employment status, month of nurse visit, survey-wave dummies vs
age of the oldest person in the household.
Figure 1.2: Effect of the Winter Fuel Payment on the probability of having a fibrino-
gen level larger than 4 g/l.
 
Figure 1.2 plots the residuals from a regression of the Prob(Fibrinogen ≥ 4) on type
of household, gender, smoker status, alcohol consumption, Body Mass Index, waist,
education, income, employment status, month of nurse visit, survey-wave dummies vs
age of the oldest person in the household.
16
Figure 1.3: Effect of the Winter Fuel Payment on the probability of having had a
recent chest infection.
 
Figure 1.3 plots the residuals from a regression of the Prob (Chest Infection in the last
3 weeks) on type of household, gender, smoker status, alcohol consumption, Body Mass
Index, waist, education, income, employment status, month of nurse visit, survey-wave
dummies vs age of the oldest person in the household.
Figure 1.4: Effect of the Winter Fuel Payment on the probability of having hyper-
tension
 
Figure 1.4 plots the residuals from a regression of the Prob(Hypertension) on type
of household, gender, smoker status, alcohol consumption, Body Mass Index, waist,
education, income, employment status, month of nurse visit, survey-wave dummies vs
age of the oldest person in the household.
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two best-fit lines at the cut-off. Three of the four figures indicate decline in illness
incidence with WFP eligibility. The exception is self-reported chest infection. The
plots also indicate that the paths of illness incidence across age of the old household
member are quite noisy, with significant year on year fluctuations. Although we
have substantial sample sizes (each point represents about 400 observations), we are
modelling relatively rare events (in our sample 5.5 % of the elderly just below the
cut-off present a CRP value larger than 10 mg/l and 12.5 % a fibrinogen value in
excess of 4 g/l, see 1.1). To assess the magnitudes and statistical significance of the
discontinuities visible in these figures we turn to formal RDD estimates (as described
above). These are reported in Table 1.2.
In Table 1.2 each column gives the estimate of the WFP effect on the health outcomes
in our preferred specification with linear functions of the forcing variable, f(), covari-
ates, and a sample age window (for the age of the oldest member in the household
window) of 55 to 65 years. The point estimates suggest that the WFP improved the
health of the elderly at age 61, reducing all our measures of illness. Effect sizes are 1
to 6 percentage points.
However, the WFP only has a statistically significant effect at 5 % level on having a
high concentration of fibrinogen. 18 It decreases the probability of a fibrinogen value
in excess of 4 g/l by 5.5 percentage points. As 12.5 % of the elderly just below the
cut-off have a value of fibrinogen in excess of 4 g/l, our estimate implies a 44 % reduc-
tion in the incidence of this measure of illness at the age cut-off. Data on the CRP
are noisier and the discontinuity effect at the cut-off is not statistically significant at
conventional levels. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the WFP effect (1.2 percentage
points) is sizeable and implies a 22 % reduction in the incidence of illness by this
measure, again at the cut-off. 19 In Column 3 we report the effect on self-reporting
18This finding is robust to the adjustment for multiple testing using the Romano-Wolf algorithm
(see the third line in Table 1.2).
19The fraction of elderly just below the age 61 cut-off with CRP value larger than 10 mg/l is
18
Table 1.2: The impact of the Winter Fuel Payment on predictors of infection.
Effect of the WFP on Fibrinogen, C-reactive protein, Self-reported
Chest Infection and Hypertension
Fibrinogen C-reactive protein
Causal Effect of Eligibility -0.055*** -0.012
(95% Confidence Interval) (-0.077; -0.033) (-0.044; 0.020)
Minimum Detectable Effect ±0.028 ±0.040
(at 80% power)
Unadjusted P-Value 0.000 0.418
(Adjusted for Multiple (0.022) (0.221)
Testing)
Number of observations 3,974 4,517
Age Window 55-65 55-65
Self-reported Hypertension
Chest infection
Causal Effect of Eligibility -0.024* -0.018
(95% Confidence Interval) (-0.049; 0.001) (-0.049; 0.012)
Minimum Detectable Effect ±0.031 ±0.038
(at 80% power)
Unadjusted P-Value 0.058 0.207
(Adjusted for Multiple (0.091) (0.119)
Testing)
Number of observations 4,569 6,295
Age Window 55-65 55-65
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Standard Errors clustered by age of the oldest household member. The RDDs have a linear
specification in the age of oldest member in the household. Additional covariates in the RDD:
type of household, gender, smoker status, alcohol consumption, Body Mass Index, waist,
education, income, employment status, month of nurse visit, survey-wave dummies vs age of
the oldest person in the household.
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a chest infection in the last 3 weeks and in Column 4 we report the effect on the
incidence of hypertension. The effects are about 2 percentage points, but neither is
statistically significant at 5 % level. The largest point estimate of an effect is for
Fibrinogen above the normal range. This is also the most precisely estimate effect.
To get an idea of the power of our tests, we calculate, for each outcome, the minimum
effect size we would have 80 % power to detect. These are displayed in the third row
of Table 1.2. Although we have quite large samples sizes, minimum detectable effects
are quite large. This is partly because we are examining the incidence of extreme
values, and partly because we only have clean identification of treatment effects at
the eligibility cut-off and must model the evolution of illness incidence on either side
of the cut-off.
In Table 1.3 we explore the robustness of our results by varying our RDD specification
in 5 ways. We first implement a quadratic polynomial for f( ), the function of the
forcing variable relative to the age cut-off. We then re-estimate the models without
including covariates in our specification. We further investigate whether our findings
are sensitive to a change in the choice of the sample age window (either wider or
narrower). Finally we drop the observations with the oldest member of the household
aged 60 or 61 for whom we cannot determine whether they received the WFP or not
exactly.
We find that our estimates of the discontinuity effect for the fibrinogen are robust
to any of these changes in the RDD specification. The coefficient of the WFP effect
is always statistically significant at 1 % level and the effect size lies between 4.4
percentage points and 8.7 percentage points. 20 This implies a reduction of 35 % to
70 % in the incidence of a high serum concentration of fibrinogen at the age cut-off.
For the other measures of illness we find a negative coefficient in all the specifications
6.3%.
20All estimates are statistically significant at 5 % level after adjusting for multiple testing except
for the specification with a quadratic function of the forcing variable, where p=0.074.
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indicating an improvement in health with WFP eligibility. However, the estimates
are variable and rarely statistically significant at conventional levels.
Table 1.4: Falsification Tests: Effect of a “placebo” eligibility at age 55
and age 65, and effect on above median fibrinogen concentration.
Effect of WFP on Fibrinogen
Cut-off age 55 -0.015
(95% Confidence Interval) (-0.057; 0.026)
Age Window 50-60
Cut-off age 65 0.004
(95% Confidence Interval) (-0.052; 0.060)
Age Window 60-70
Prob(Fibrinogen ≥ 3.1g/l) 0.009
(95% Confidence Interval) (-0.046; 0.065)
Age Window 55-65
Standard Errors clustered by age of the oldest member level. Additional covariates
in the RDD: type of household, gender, smoker status, alcohol consumption, Body
Mass Index, waist, education, income, employment status, month of nurse visit,
survey-wave dummies vs age of the oldest person in the household.
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
We now provide some further checks on our main finding of a WFP effect on the
incidence of high concentrations of fibrinogen. In Table 1.4 we present falsification
tests for an effect at age cut-offs of 55 and 65. As these are not the eligibility cut-off,
we should find no effect at these ages. As a further falsification test we check for an
effect on the incidence of fibrinogen concentrations above the sample median. The
idea here is that having an above-median concentration of fibrinogen is not a marker
of disease. If we are measuring a reduction in disease incidence, that effect should
22
be observed only in the upper tail of the distribution (as in our main estimates) and
not around the median. 21 As Table 1.4 illustrates, we do not find any evidence of
an effect across these specifications. This increases our confidence in the main effect
reported in Table 1.2.
We also considered what our estimated effects for the incidence of fibrinogen concen-
tration in excess of 4 g/l imply for levels fibrinogen in the upper tail of the distribu-
tion. To do this we estimate a quantile regression version of the RDD. Note that our
base specification studies the probability that measured serum Fibrinogen exceeds a
specified cut-off, and how this probability differs with WFP eligibility holding the
cut-off constant at k :
Pit(WFPit) = Prob(H
Fib
it > k|WFPit) (1.3)
A quantile regression inverts this relationship, holding the probability constant (at
the chosen quantile, 1 - P) and asking, essentially, how the cut-off varies with WFP
eligibility.
kit = F1−P (HFibit |WFPit) (1.4)
In our sample prob(HFibit = 1) ≈ 12% and the RDD estimates show that this falls
by 6.1 percentage points with WFP eligibility. In this robustness check we consider
how the 85th and 90th conditional quantiles of HFibit vary with WFP eligibility (cor-
responding to P = 0.15 and P = 0.1 ). We find in both cases a drop in Fibrinogen of
about 0.11 g/l. However the effects are less precisely estimated than the probability
models. 22
We finally follow Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007) and create a Poor Health Index to
21The median fibrinogen in the neighbourhood of the age cut-off is 3.1 g/l (see Table 1.1).
22Inference for quantile regression is not straight forward. Asymptotic standard errors are not
regarded as reliable and we employ a bootstrap procedure. Full details and results are available
from the authors on request.
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Figure 1.5: Effect of the Winter Fuel Payment on the Poor Health Index.
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RD plot - Poor Health Index
Figure 1.5 plots the residuals from a regression of the Poor Health Index on type
of household, gender, smoker status, alcohol consumption, Body Mass Index, waist,
education, income, employment status, month of nurse visit, survey-wave dummies vs
age of the oldest person in the household.
improve the statistical power of detecting effects of the same sign and implement the
RDD on this new measure. The Poor Health Index synthetises in a single measure
our indicators of cardiovascular and respiratory diseases. We exclude self-reports
of chest infection and focus on our binary objective measures, serum-Fibrinogen in
excess of 4 g/l, serum-CRP in excess of 10 mg/l and Hypertension. 23 For each of
these outcomes we calculate the z-scores subtracting the mean of the group of people
just below the eligibility cut-off and dividing by the standard deviation of the same
group. The Poor Health Index is the average of the three z-scores and a low value of
the index is evidence of better health.
We first present the impact of the WFP on the Poor Health Index graphically in
Figure 1.5. As in the Figures reported before, we interpret a discontinuity at the
eligibility cut-off as evidence of an effect of the WFP on our index. The data in
23Self-reports of chest infection is the only measure that does not show a clear pattern in the
data and is not reported in HSE.
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Figure 1.5 are still noisy as in the analysis of the single objective health outcomes,
but there is a visible drop in the Poor Health index around the eligibility cut-off.
In Table 1.5 we show the size of the effect of the WFP on the Poor Health Index
implementing various specifications of the RDD. The analysis includes only obser-
vations with a valid measure of Fibrinogen, CRP and Hypertension. The reduction
of the Poor Health Index is in the range of 0.2 to 0.45 standard deviations with our
estimates all statistically significant at 5 % level. Our preferred specification is pre-
sented in Column 1 and shows a decrease in the Poor Health Index of 0.23 standard
deviations.
Table 1.6: Impact of the Winter Fuel Payment on the Poor
Health Index in sub-groups.
Excluding Low-Income: Low Educated
Summer Months 1st quartile
-0.367* -0.039 -0.460***
(-0.772; 0.039) [-0.433; 0.354] [-0.681; -0.239]
N= 2,351 N= 786 N= 980
Standard Errors clustered by age of the oldest member level. 95%
Confidence Interval. Linear Specification in age of oldest household
member. Age Window: 55-65. Summer months excluded : June, July,
August and September. Low-Educated highest qualification reported:
No Qualification, NVQ level 1, NVQ level 2. Additional covariates in
the RDD: type of household, gender, smoker status, alcohol consump-
tion, Body Mass Index, waist, education, income, employment status,
month of nurse visit, survey-wave dummies vs age of the oldest person
in the household.
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
We replicate the analysis on the Poor Health Index for three sub-samples of obser-
vations to investigate whether there are specific groups that drive our findings. In
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the first Column of Table 1.6, we report the estimates on a sample which excludes
observations with a nurse visit in summer. The rational is that we do not expect
any beneficial effect of the WFP on health in the summer months. Consistent with
this expectation we find a slightly larger reduction in the Poor Health Index than
in the full sample (a point estimate of 0.36 standard deviations that is statistically
significant at 10 % level.) Second, we estimate the effect of the WFP on the Poor
Health Index for low-income respondents. Beatty et al. (2014) show a particularly
significant increase in the fuel expenditure for poorer households. These households
should therefore experience larger health benefits. We find an effect magnitude of
-0.04 standard deviations that is not precisely estimated, in part because of the re-
duction in the sample size. Finally, we consider the effect of WFP eligibility among
low education respondents. Here we find a very large and statistically significant
effect of around 0.46 standard deviations.
1.4 Discussion and conclusions
We find evidence to suggest that raising the cut-off age for WFP eligibility had
a negative effect on the health of individuals made ineligible. We find a robust
and statistically significant effect for only one of the individual illness measures we
consider, though point estimates for all the markers we consider point in this direction.
Reductions of 1 to 6 percentage points (for fairly rare events) are large effect sizes.
Using a Poor Health Index that combines our illness markers, we find particularly
large effects for low educated individuals.
For healthcare providers, these results highlight the need to be sensitive to inadequate
indoor heating as a potential winter health risk, perhaps particularly among low
education individuals who fall just short of eligibility for the WFP.
27
The eligibility for the WFP is tied to the Female State Pension age. As the Female
State Pension age is been rising, eligibility is being tightened to older ages. This will
be 65 in 2018.
Our RDD estimates the causal effect of the WFP on the health of individuals living
in households where the oldest member of the household is 61. This is very useful
because these are precisely the individuals who lost any benefits of the WPF as the
eligibility age was incrementally increased from 2010. Our results therefore challenge
the assumption of some analysts that raising the eligibility age would reduce program
costs without any health cost. At a minimum, further research is needed to determine
the loss of health benefits associated with potential future increases in the eligibility
age.
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Appendix
A1 Winter Fuel Payment eligibility
Table A1: Winter Fuel Payment eligibility.
WFP WFP WFP
Month of the Eligibility age eligibility eligibility eligibility
nurse visit Aged 60 Aged 61 Aged 62
January 60 + 4 months 8/12 1 1
February 60 + 5 months 7/12 1 1
March 60 + 6 months 6/12 1 1
April 60 + 7 months 5/12 1 1
May 60 + 8 months 4/12 1 1
June 60 + 9 months 3/12 1 1
July 60 + 10 months 2/12 1 1
August 60 + 11 months 1/12 1 1
September 61 0 1 1
October 61 + 1 months 0 11/12 1
November 61 + 2 months 0 10/12 1
December 61 + 3 months 0 9/12 1
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Chapter 2
Does a housing subsidy cut really
lower rents? Evidence from a
reform in the UK
2.1 Introduction
In-kind transfers such as housing subsidies and food stamps are provided to encour-
age consumption of goods that are believed necessary to improve the individual and
social well-being. By giving in-kind subsidies rather than cash transfers, governments
aim to induce recipients to consume more subsidised goods than they would do volun-
tarily. This paternalistic justification of in-kind transfers is based on the rational that
governments are concerned about the distribution of subsidised goods as well as the
reduction of income inequality (Tobin, 1970; Rosen, 1983; Currie & Gahvari, 2008).
Economic theory, however, predicts that in-kind transfers come at a cost. Subsidies
do shift upward the demand of subsidised goods, but unless the supply is perfectly
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elastic, the market price of subsidised goods increases in response to a rise in the
demand. This change in price implies that part of the benefit of subsidies accrues to
suppliers. To evaluate the extent to which the benefit is split between consumers and
suppliers, the literature commonly calculates the incidence of a subsidy, a measure
of how much the price of the subsidised good rises with a marginal increase in the
subsidy unit.
In this paper we focus on the incidence of a housing subsidy, a transfer that gov-
ernments assign to low-income households to help them to pay for the rent of an
adequate property. Governments allocate housing subsidies under the assumptions
that low-income households consume less housing than appropriate and housing is an
important determinant of quality of life. Indeed, better housing has a positive impact
on children educational attainment (Currie & Yelowitz, 2000; Goux & Maurin, 2005)
and living in less deprived neighbourhoods improves physical and mental health for
adults (Ludwig et al., 2011, 2012; Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2003) and decreases
mortality (Jacob, Ludwig, & Miller, 2013).
However the standard theory predicts that housing subsidies affect rents when the
supply does not adequately respond to the new housing demand. The change in rents
due to the subsidy might not be limited to subsidy recipients and it might extend to
the whole rental market (Susin, 2002; Eriksen & Ross, 2015). This is the typical case
when some of the incidence of the housing subsidy is on tenants.
This paper investigates the incidence of housing subsidies on subsidised and unsub-
sidised tenants using a reform implemented in 2011 in the United Kingdom (UK)
that aimed at tackling the stark growth in housing assistance outlays. The amount
of subsidy that recipients received was to some extent linked to their rent and the
UK government believed the housing subsidy outlays were excessive because
“some unscrupulous landlords were charging benefit claimants over the
odds to make a quick buck at the expense of the taxpayer.”
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(Lord Freud, Welfare Reform Minister, 10/2010)
A series of changes in the housing subsidy system were introduced to reduce the
generosity of the subsidy and in the intention of the government the reform would
“bring an overall downward pressure on rents in the private sector.
As these rents come down, more properties would become available to
claimants and landlords would have certainty that their income would be
protected.”
(Lord Freud, Welfare Reform Minister, 11/2010)
However, the incidence of the subsidy might still fall on tenants if other factors than
the housing demand of subsidised tenants affect rents. Among them, we highlight
three factors that could explain why rents did not fall in response to the subsidy cut in
this context. First, landlords might be reluctant to let properties to housing subsidy
recipients and can replace them with unsubsidised tenants. The housing supply can
be relatively elastic whether the pool of houses is restricted or expanded on the basis
of landlords’ decisions of letting to subsidy recipients. Second, the rental market and
the home owner market are interconnected. When first-home buyers find difficult to
purchase a property because of credit constraints or policies that incentivise landlords
to invest in properties, the rental market of unsubsidised tenants expands and the
chances of landlords of finding a substitute for subsidy recipients increase. The third
factor is related to the nominal rigidity in the short term. Some contracts are agreed
on a multi-year basis and tenants might not be able to re-negotiate their rent with
landlords in the short term. In this latter case the incidence would entirely fall on
tenants.
Several studies have examined the incidence of housing subsidies, but they have
focused on either subsidised tenants (Gibbons and Manning, 2006; Fack, 2006; Kan-
gasharju, 2010; Viren, 2013; Collinson and Ganong, 2015; Brewer et al., 2014) or
32
unsubsidised tenants (Susin, 2002; Eriksen & Ross, 2015). Research on subsidised
tenants have shown that the incidence of the housing subsidy is shared between ten-
ants and landlords. However, empirical estimates are mixed and report an incidence
in the range of 10 % and 90 %. In particular, for the UK, Gibbons and Manning
(2006) examine the effect of a housing subsidy reform in the mid-90s and find that the
incidence of the subsidy on landlords was around 60 % . On the other hand, Brewer
et al. (2014) use administrative data exploiting the same reform as this paper and
estimate that the incidence was 10 % on landlords. The evidence on the effect of
housing subsidies on unsubsidised tenants is also heterogeneous. Analysing data on
rents of the US biggest metropolitan areas, Susin (2002) finds that an increase in
the number of housing vouchers raised rents in low income neighbourhoods for un-
subsidised households on average by 16 %. Eriksen and Ross (2015) report a much
smaller increase in rents of medium quality properties and a slight fall in lower-quality
properties in response to a higher provision of vouchers. As in the prediction of the
standard model, the magnitude of the incidence is, however, sensitive to the supply
elasticity in the metropolitan area.
This paper adds to the literature on the incidence offering a link between the stud-
ies on the incidence on subsidised tenants and the studies on unsubsidised tenants.
Using data from the Family Resource Survey (FRS) and the English Housing Survey
(EHS), two cross-sectional surveys that include rich information on property charac-
teristics, we exploit the housing subsidy reform in 2011 as a quasi-natural experiment
to estimate the incidence of the subsidy. For subsidised tenants we follow Brewer et
al. (2014) and Gibbons and Manning (2006) and run two separate regressions that
estimate the effect of the reform on subsidy receipts and rents. The incidence of the
housing subsidy is the ratio between the effect of the reform on rents and the effect
of the reform on subsidy receipts. A second strategy follows Fack (2006) and uses the
reform as an instrument for subsidy receipt. In this case the incidence is recovered
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from the second stage where rents are regressed on the predicted values of the subsidy
receipt. For unsubsidised tenants, the incidence is estimated through deviations from
a time trend that rents would have followed if the reform had not been introduced.
We find that the average subsidy receipt fell by 7 % after the reform, but rents of
subsidised tenants did not significantly fall in response to the subsidy cut. The esti-
mated incidence on landlords is 7 % in line with the finding of Brewer et al. (2014).
Unsurprisingly, the reform is estimated to have had hardly any impact on the rents
of unsubsidised tenants. 33 months after the UK government started to implement
the reform, the central estimate is that rents for unsubsidised tenants fell by 0.3 %,
and this effect fades away later. In the most deprived areas, where subsidy recipients
made up a larger share of the private rental market, the impact on unsubsidised ten-
ants was not significantly larger.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes how a
housing subsidy affects the rental market. Section 3 provides details of the LHA
reform. Section 4 discusses the the empirical strategy to estimate the incidence of
a housing subsidy cut. Section 5 describes the data and some descriptive statistics.
Section 6 presents the findings on the incidence on subsidised and unsubsidised ten-
ants. Section 7 and 8 conclude providing possible explanations on why the incidence
of a housing subsidy mostly fell on tenants.
2.2 The incidence of the housing subsidy
The purpose of a housing subsidy is to make adequate dwellings affordable for low-
income households. An housing subsidy is not a plain cash transfer, but it is often
related to the rent of a property up to a certain ceiling. In this perspective, a
subsidy cut should reduce the housing consumption of low-income households that
would otherwise opt for more expensive and higher quality dwellings. Landlords
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might charge a lower rent in response to the decreased demand of subsidy recipients.
However the drop in rents can be lower than the subsidy cut. The share of the subsidy
cut that is not covered by the reduction in rents and is paid out of pocket by claimants
is the incidence on tenants. The subsidy cut can also affect the equilibrium in the
whole rental market. In this case the subsidy has also an incidence on unsubsidised
tenants.
The incidence of the housing subsidy depends on the conditions of the rental market.
In particular, the incidence is higher when the housing supply is inelastic, the housing
demand is elastic and there is no nominal rigidity in rents. In the next sections, I
review the rental market models presented in the literature of the incidence of the
housing subsidy and describe the model of this paper.
2.2.1 Rental market models
The literature on the incidence of housing subsidies presents different models of the
rental market. All these models take the competitive rental market as a benchmark.
In a competitive setting, tenants are not discriminated according to whether they re-
ceive a subsidy to pay for their rents. Subsidised and unsubsidised tenants therefore
pay the same rent for a certain property. When a subsidy is reduced, the housing de-
mand of subsidised tenants decreases and rents fall. Interestingly, the model predicts
that the subsidy cut would lower the rent of a property by an equal amount regard-
less of the type of tenant. The extent of any fall in rents depends on the elasticity
of demand and supply for housing. The more responsive is the housing demand and
the more inelastic is the housing supply, the higher is the drop in rents caused by the
subsidy cut. In addition, rents would fall by more in areas with high concentration
of subsidised tenants.
However, several studies provide evidence of frictions in the rental market. Gibbons
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and Manning (2006) show that a reform implemented in the UK in 1996/97 reduced
rents only for recipients affected by the subsidy reduction, and had no significant
impact on unsubsidised tenants. This finding supports a matching model where
subsidised tenants have some bargaining power in negotiating a rent reduction with
landlords. However, the fall in rents for subsidised tenants does not fully cover the
subsidy cut because landlords can always opt for letting the property to unsubsidised
tenants that are willing to pay higher rents. In the matching model, unsubsidised ten-
ants also benefit from the subsidy cut but the effect on their rents is smaller compared
to subsidised tenants. In an analogous paper Fack (2006) assumes that the rental
market is divided into two separated sub-markets, one for low-income tenants and
the other for high-income tenants. With the introduction of a subsidy, the housing
supply in the low-income rental market plays a crucial role because subsidised tenants
cannot rent a property in the high income sub-market. If their increased housing de-
mand is not matched by a further and better provision of properties in the low-income
segment, the model predicts that the incidence of the subsidy is entirely on tenants.
Collinson and Ganong (2016) suggest a model where subsidy claimants have a lim-
ited time to find a suitable property in order to keep their subsidy eligibility. They
are risk adverse and prefer finding a suitable dwelling in a low-income neighbourhood
rather than searching a property in well-off neighbourhoods where landlords are more
likely to refuse subsidy claimants. In this setting, a policy that sets a flat rate across
neighbourhoods in a certain local area raises rents and traps subsidy recipients in
low-income neighbourhoods. On the other hand, a policy that changes the rates in
every neighobourhood within a local area leads some subsidy claimants to move from
low-income neighbourhoods to higher income neighbourhoods.
Other papers exclusively focus on the spillover effects on unsubsidised tenants. The
milestone study is Susin (2002) that suggests a rental market split in three segments
according to the income of the residents in the local area: low-, middle- and high- in-
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come neighbourhoods. The three rental markets are separated and subsidised tenants
are trapped in the low- income neighbourhoods. An increase in the housing subsidy
has the effect of bidding up rents only in the whole low-income market. In contrast
to Susin (2002), Eriksen and Ross (2015) suggest a rental market where claimants
effectively move across neighbourhoods. In their model, housing subsidies increase
rents of properties with a pre-subsidy rent near the subsidy rate and decrease rents
of low-quality properties. This is because subsidised tenants leave low-quality prop-
erties and instead demand properties near the subsidy rate. Moreover, the impact of
housing subsidies varies according to the supply elasticities of the local areas. Rents
only rise in local areas where constructors cannot adjust the supply of houses to
match the increased housing demand.
2.2.2 The incidence of a housing subsidy
Following Susin (2002), we set up a model to show how a housing subsidy affects
rents paid by subsidised and unsubsidised tenants in the private rental market. The
setting is a competitive market where subsidised and unsubsidised tenants rent their
dwellings choosing from the same pool of properties. In a setting with housing subsidy
in place, landlords provide QS properties and tenants demand QD housing . QS
depends on RS, the price that landlords receive to supply QS:
QS = A(RS)εSHS (2.1)
The demand of subsidy recipients QDSu and the demand of unsubsidised tenants Q
D
U
are
QDSu = (
RS
Sub
)−εDHD (2.2)
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QDU = (R
S)−εDHD (2.3)
where Sub is the housing subsidy and RDSu =
RS
Sub
is rent for recipients and RDU = R
S
is rent for unsubsidised tenants, HS and HD are supply and demand shifters, εS and
εD are the elasticity of supply and demand.
It is convenient to define the housing demand QD as the sum of lnQDSu, the hous-
ing demand of subsidised tenants, and lnQDU , the housing demand of unsubsidised
tenants:
lnQD = lnQDSu + lnQ
D
U =
1
N
(
∑
i∈NU
qUi +
∑
i∈NSu
qSui ) (2.4)
Using the log format, the housing demand for subsidised and unsubsidised tenants is
expressed in terms of the demand elasticity εD :
lnQDSu = pSu(hD − εD ln(RS) + εD ln(Sub) + ηSu) (2.5)
lnQDU = (1− pSu)(hD − εD lnRS + ηU) (2.6)
where the proportion of subsidised tenants is pSu, the proportion of unsubsidised
tenants is (1− pSu) and hD = lnHD. The housing demand lnQD is defined as
lnQD = pSu(hD − εD ln(RS) + εD ln(Sub) + ηSu) + (1− pSu)(hD − εD lnRS + ηU)
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and re-arranging the terms on the right hand side
lnQD = hD − εD ln(RS) + pSuεD ln(Sub) + ηD
Likewise, using the log format and defining hS = lnH
S, the housing is supply is
lnQS = hS + εS lnR
S + ηS (2.7)
Setting lnQD = lnQS gives the following:
a+ εS lnR
S + ηS = hD − εD ln(RS) + pSuεD ln(Sub) + ηD (2.8)
Rents in the steady state are
lnRS =
1
εS + εD
· [hD − hS − pSuεD ln(Sub) + ηD − ηS] (2.9)
and the incidence of the housing subsidy on landlords is
IL =
pSuεD
εS + εD
(2.10)
2.3 The Local Housing Allowance reform
Housing is an important component of the welfare state in the UK. In 2014 the UK
Government spent more than £24 billion on housing subsidies which made up 14
% of the total benefit expenditure and 0.5 % of the GDP 1. Of this amount, the
UK government spent nearly £9 billion to subsidise claimants in the private rental
1Housing subsidy figures are from the Department for Work and Pension (2015) and data on
GDP is from the Office for National Statistics
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market, whereas the rest funded social housing (Department for Work and Pension,
2015). In an attempt to control the sharp increase on housing expenditure seen in
the first decade of the 21st century (see Figure 2.1), the UK government reformed
the housing subsidy system in April 2011 by implementing a series of measures that
reduced the generosity of the subsidy.
The amount of housing subsidy that claimants received depended on their income
Figure 2.1: Housing Subsidy (HS) expenditure in the UK. 2000-2014
Source: Department for Work and Pensions.
and the Local Housing Allowance (LHA), a flat rate based on the composition of
the household and the local area - the Broad Rental Market Area (BRMA) - where
the claimant lived. The boundaries of the BRMAs were defined according to the
availability of a series of facilities and services in the local area. For each of the 152
BRMAs, a governmental institution - the Valuation Office Agency (VOA)- period-
ically released the LHA rates that varied with the number of bedrooms a claimant
was entitled to.
In the pre-reform system VOA determined six LHA rates. Single childless cus-
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tomers aged under 25 were entitled to the Shared Accommodation rate, whereas
other claimants could be eligible up to the five bedroom rate depending on the size of
their household. The LHA rates were set at the median of the BRMA rent distribu-
tion and claimants were allowed to keep the excess (up to £15) between the subsidy
and their actual rent if the rent charged by the landlord was lower than the LHA rate.
Table 2.1: Implementation of the LHA reform by month of claim
Claim Month Transitory period New System Rules
New Claim(April 2011-) - Since the claim
April April 2011-December 2011 January 2012
May May 2011-January 2012 February 2012
June June 2011-February 2012 March 2012
July July 2011-March 2012 April 2012
August August 2011-April 2012 May 2012
September September 2011-May 2012 June 2012
October October 2011-June 2012 July 2012
November November 2011-July 2012 August 2012
December December 2011-August 2012 September 2012
January January 2011-September 2012 October 2012
February February 2011-October 2012 November 2012
March March 2011-November 2012 December 2012
With the April 2011 reform the calculation of the maximum entitlement was shifted
to the 30th percentile of the BRMA rent distribution, the five bedroom rate was
abolished and the Shared Accommodation Rate was extended to cover single child-
less adults aged between 25 and 34. In addition, the reform established that the LHA
rates could not exceed some national caps and claimants were no longer entitled to
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keep the £15 excess.
The time when claimants were rolled onto the new system differed for old and new
claimants (see Table 2.1). LHA claimants that first claimed the subsidy after April
2011 or had a reassessment of their claim after that date were immediately subject to
the new rules.2. Old claimants that were receiving the subsidy before the implemen-
tation of the reform became part of the new system at the first anniversary of their
claim. In the first phase, they only lost the entitlement to keep the £15 excess. Nine
months after the anniversary of their claim, the transitory period ended and they
were fully rolled onto the new system. For example, an old claimant that had made
a claim in April 2010 was fully rolled onto the new system in January 2012, whereas
the new rules only applied in December 2012 for a claimant whose anniversary was
in March 2010.
2.4 Identification strategy
2.4.1 The incidence on landlords that let to subsidised
tenants
The empirical analysis of the incidence of a housing subsidy hinges on the quasi-
experimental design of the 2011 LHA reform. We first investigate whether the LHA
reform lowered the amount of subsidy received, as was the intentions of the UK
government. Second, we estimate how the reform affected rents paid by claimants
and calculate the incidence of the housing subsidy. Finally, we investigate whether
the subsidy cut had a spillover effect on rents paid by unsubsidised tenants.
We implement two strategies to examine the incidence of the subsidy on claimants.
2A reassessment of a claim could be triggered by a change in the circumstances or if claimants
moved to a new property
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The first methodology follows Gibbons and Manning (2006) and Brewer et al. (2015)
and estimate the impact of the reform on subsidy receipts and rents with two separate
regressions shown in equations (2.11) and (2.12):
lnSubst = β0 + β1tm + β2dst + x
′
stγ + st (2.11)
lnRst = α0 + α1tm + α2dst + x
′
stδ + ηst (2.12)
where the subscript s denotes the subsidy recipient and t denotes the time of the
interview, Subst is the subsidy receipt, Rst is the rent paid by the recipient, tm is
a monthly time trend, dst is a binary variable that indicates whether the recipient
received the subsidy according to the post-reform rules and xst are control variables
such as property and household characteristics. The two regressions are estimated
with OLS and standard errors are clustered at BRMA level.
The identification strategy exploits the reform as an exogenous change in the subsidy
receipt. Indeed claimants observed before the implementation of the reform differed
from claimants observed after the implementation only for the LHA system they were
enrolled in.
All claimants observed before April 2011 were not affected by the reform and received
the housing subsidies with the pre-reform rules (dst = 0). Claimants observed after
January 2013 were all enrolled in the new LHA system (dst = 1). During the reform
enforcement (April 2011- December 2012) claimants could be in the pre-reform system
or the post-reform system depending on their claimant status. New claimants were
recipients that claimed the subsidy for the first time or had a reassessment of their
claim in the period the reform was enforced. They were immediately enrolled onto
the post-reform regime (dst = 1). Old claimants were recipients that had already
claimed the housing subsidy before the reform and were fully rolled onto the new
system at the end of the transitory period, nine months after their claim anniversary.
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3 However the data do not have information on the subsidy rules that applied to
claimants at the time of the interview. The strategy used to deal with this issue
varies with the survey. The FRS releases the month and the year when the last
subsidy claim was made. Matching this information with the date of the interview
allows to establish whether the claimant was in the pre- or post-reform system. In the
EHS the information on the claim anniversary is not available and the LHA regime of
the claimant cannot be established. In this case we assign to the post-reform regime
only recipients that moved to a new property after April 2011. 4. For the rest of the
sample, the LHA system status is determined parametrically. The reform variable
dst is (1/12, 2/12,...,12/12) according to the end-of-the-transitory-period probability.
As an example, old claimants observed in January 2012 have dst = 1/12 because only
claimants whose claim anniversary was in April were rolled onto the new system in
that month. The new rules applied to any claimants observed in December 2012 and
dst is therefore 12/12 (full details are described in Table B1 in Appendix B1).
The changes of the LHA reform could trigger an anticipatory response from subsidy
recipients. For example recipients could move to a cheaper house before the reform
to offset the subsidy cut. Or landlords could renew contracts shortly before the
reform agreeing lower rents in the wake of the forthcoming subsidy reduction. If
there was anticipatory response our estimates of the incidence would be downward
biased. However, in our specification we do not deal with anticipation effects.
After estimating the average effect of the reform on subsidy receipts and rents on
subsidised tenants, we can calculate the incidence of the housing subsidy. It estimates
how the burden of the subsidy is shared between tenants and landlords. A fall in rents
in response to the LHA reform implies that landlords are affected by the subsidy cut.
3Old claimants had a nine-month transitory period in which they lost only the the entitlement
to keep the £15 excess
4Claimants that moved to a different accommodation are assigned to the post-reform system
because a change in the address led to a reassessment of their claim. We determine whether a
claimant moved to a new property after April 2011 matching the information on the length of
tenancy and the interview date.
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The incidence on landlords is calculated as the proportion of the cut in the subsidy
receipts that is covered by the rent decrease. In this specification the coefficient α2
and β2 in equation (2.11) and (2.12) represent how much the reform affected rents
and subsidy receipts Subst. The incidence on landlords IL is estimated through the
ratio of these coefficients:
IL =
α2
β2
(2.13)
My second strategy follows Fack (2006), and regresses rents on subsidy receipt using
the reform as an instrument. 5 The amount of subsidy received is endogenous
because it is correlated with unobserved characteristics that determine rents. The IV
approach is implemented in two stages.
In the first stage I regress subsidy receipts Subst on the reform dst and control variables
as in equation (2.14)
lnSubst = ρ0 + ρ1tm + ρ2dst + x
′
stµ+ ηst (2.14)
The second stage is a regression of rents Rst on the fitted values of subsidy receipts
l̂nSubst obtained in the first stage.
lnRst = θ0 + θ1tm + θ2 l̂nSubst + x
′
stpi + νst (2.15)
The coefficient θ2 in the second stage represents the rent percentage change in re-
sponse to a 1 % increase of the subsidy. θ2 is therefore an estimate of the incidence of
the subsidy on landlords. The classical assumption of the exclusion restriction holds
if the reform dst is uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic shock in the second stage.
Cov(dst, νst) = 0 (2.16)
5The equivalence of the two regression strategy and the IV approach is shown in Appendix B2.
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The reform dst satisfies the exclusion restriction assumption because it caused the
exogenous change in housing subsidies occurred in 2011. Although all claimants were
affected by the LHA reform, they were not affected evenly by the new rules. The
introduction of the national caps affected people living in areas of London where
the 30th percentile of the rent distributions was higher than the national LHA lim-
its (2011-2014 LHA rates, VOA). 6 Singles aged between 25 and 34 were no longer
entitled to the One Bedroom Rate but instead to the less generous Shared Accommo-
dation Rate, whereas large households faced the abolition of the Five Bedroom Rate.
In the equation (2.14) and (2.15) we avoid any source of bias including dummies for
these categories in the controls xit.
2.4.2 The incidence on unsubsidised tenants
After estimating the incidence of the housing subsidy on subsidised tenants, we ex-
amine whether the subsidy cut affected rents of private tenants that do not receive
any subsidy. In a competitive rental market there is a single price for subsidised and
unsubsidised tenants and a fall in rents for subsidised tenants should lead to a fall in
rents for unsubsidised tenants. The effect of the reform for unsubsidised tenants is
estimated through deviations from the linear time trend that rents would have had
if the reform had not been implemented (see Figure 2.2).
The implementation of the LHA reform can be split in three different time windows:
the first nine months after April 2011 when only the new claimants were rolled onto
the new system, the period from January 2012 to December 2012 when claimants
gradually flowed to the new system depending on their anniversary claim and the
period after January 2013 when the reformed system was fully implemented. Thus,
we allow for three deviations from the monthly linear trend tm that rents would have
6Over the period 2011-2014 the national caps were binding in Central London and for most of
the rates in the BRMAs in Inner London
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Figure 2.2: Impact of the LHA reform on rents of unsubsidised tenants
Apr 2011 Jan 2012 Jan 2013
Impact after 
21 months
Impact after 
9 months
had if the reform had not been implemented (the black dashed line in Figure 2.2):
Rut = α0 + α1tm + α2ta + α3tb + α4tc + +x
′
utγ + it (2.17)
where the subscript u denotes the unsubsidised recipient, Rut are rents paid by un-
subsidised tenant, ta is the deviation from the linear trend tm due to the first phase
of the reform, tb shows how the rent trend changes because of the gradual flow of
claimants in the new system and tc is the deviation from the linear trend tm after the
full enforcement of the reform changes. The pre-reform linear trend tm is estimated
with data from April 2008 to March 2011. The incidence on unsubsidised tenants is
identified under the assumption that the rent time trend would have not changed if
the reform had not been introduced.
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2.5 Data
In order to estimate the incidence of the housing subsidy on subsidised and unsub-
sidised tenants, the analysis pools data from the Family Resource Survey (FRS) and
the English Housing Survey (EHS). The FRS and the EHS are two annual cross-
sectional surveys that collect information on rents, length of tenancy, household and
dwelling characteristics. The purpose of using two sources of information is to boost
the sample size for LHA claimants. The data we use span from April 2008 to March
2014, an interval of time that gives us enough observations in the pre- and post-
reform period to estimate the time trend for rents in the private rental market.
Table B2 in Appendix B3 compares the characteristics of the pre-reform and the
post-reform groups. The pre-reform group is made up of claimants who were ob-
served before the implementation of the reform (April 2011) and old claimants who
were observed at most 8 months after the anniversary of their claim in the reform
phase-in period (April 2011-December 2012).7 The post-reform group is composed
of subsidy claimants who were observed after the full implementation of the reform
(December 2012), claimants who were observed at least 9 months after the anniver-
sary of their claim, and claimants who moved to a new property during the phase-in
period. Among the claimants observed during the phase-in of the reform, 829 are
assigned to the pre-reform group and 440 to the post-reform group. For 735 claimants
there is no sufficient information to establish if they received the LHA according to
the new or old rules. 8 As we can see from Table B2, claimants before and after the
reform pay a very similar rent. However, there is a significant drop of around 10 % in
subsidy receipts after the reform. The pre- and the post-reform groups have similar
characteristics. The t-tests reject the null hypothesis of equality of the means for
7Claimants are fully rolled onto the new LHA regime 9 months after their claim anniversary.
8This occurs if claimants do not report information on their claim anniversary or they do not
move to a new property in the reform phase-in period.
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some variables but the magnitude of the means is not substantially different.
Table B3 in Appendix B3 shows the same descriptive statistics for unsubsidised ten-
ants. Rents are not very different before and after the reform. The other variables
present very similar means. When we find difference in the means, this is for the
same variables and in the same direction of claimants (see for example the variables
lenght of tenancy, HRP age and furnished/unfurnished property). This is reassuring
that there is no selection in the post-reform group of claimants.
2.6 Results
The purpose of the LHA reform was to lower the aggregate expenditure on housing
subsidies. The expectation of the government was that the subsidy cut would reduce
rents in the private rental market leading to a minimum loss for recipients and ben-
efits for unsubsidised tenants. In other words, the government assumed the housing
subsidy to be mainly incident on landlords. In this section, we first explore whether
the effects of the reform matched the expectations of the government with a graphical
analysis and then we report the estimates of the incidence of the housing subsidy on
subsidised and unsubsidised tenants.
2.6.1 The incidence on subsidised tenants
The graphical analysis shows that the reform only affected the subsidy receipts. Fig-
ure 2.3 gives evidence that subsidy receipts remained constant over the pre-reform
period and then they fell after the implementation of the subsidy cut. Unlike the ex-
pectations of the government rents did not respond to the subsidy cut. Indeed, rents
of subsidised tenants were slightly falling in the pre-reform period, and the trend was
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Figure 2.3: Median weekly Log(Subsidy) and Median weekly Log(Rent) in 2008 prices
for LHA claimants in the private rental sector, Q2 2008- Q1 2014
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Source: English Housing Survey and Family Resource Survey.
The two vertical lines mark the introduction of the LHA reform in April 2011 and the
full implementation of the reform in December 2012.
not significantly different in the post-reform period.9
The upper panel of Table 2.2 gives the estimates of the impact of the reform on
subsidy receipts and rents using the equations (2.11) and (2.12). 10 Subsidy receipts
and rents are expressed in log terms and the coefficients of the reform can be inter-
preted as semi-elasticities. In Column (1) and (2) we only condition on the local area
fixed effect, housing subsidy rate entitlement and a survey dummy. The estimates
confirm the conclusions drawn in the graphical analysis. The reform cut the average
subsidy receipt by nearly 7 %, but rents were not affected. The inclusion of property
and demographics characteristics and the housing price index reduces the magnitude
of the effect on subsidy receipts to 5.5 % (Column (3)), whereas the effect on rents
9Subsidy receipts and rents are deflated to 2008 prices with the Consumer Price Index.
10Estimates of the reform effects do not account for a possible anticipatory behaviour of subsidy
recipients.
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Table 2.2: Effect of the reform on Log-Subsidy Receipt and Log-Rent and Incidence
of the Housing Subsidy
Log Subsidy Log Rent Log Subsidy Log Rent
(1) (1) (2) (2)
Reform −0.069*** 0.000 −0.054** −0.004
(−0.119;−0.019) (−0.031;0.030) (−0.104;−0.005) (−0.034;0.026)
Monthly −0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.000
time
trend
(−0.002;0.000) (−0.001;0.000) (−0.001;0.001) (−0.0010.000)
Incidence − 0.006 − 0.071
− (−0.426;0.437) − (−0.446;0.589)
Incidence − 0.006 − 0.071
using IV − (−0.425;0.435) − (−0.445;0.587)
N 7629 7629 7085 7085
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Confidence Intervals at 95 % in parentheses. Cluster Robust Standard Errors at BRMA level.
Control variables in Specification (1): BRMA, subsidy rate entitlement, survey dummy.
Control variables in Specification (2): controls in Specification (1), shared accommodation with
other households, length of tenancy, type of dwelling, rural-urban classification, house rented
furnished, type of utility included in the rent, age of the HRP, housing price index, deprived
area dummy, number of rooms, number of bedrooms, log-income, other benefits recipient,
non-dependant living in the household.
The incidence in the third line is calculated through the ratio between the effect of the reform
on rents and the effect on subsidy receipts as shown in equation 2.13. Point estimates and
standard errors are based on the delta method using the Stata command nlcom.
remained unaltered at around -0.4% (Column (4)). The implied estimate of the in-
cidence on landlords is around 7%, suggesting that the burden of the subsidy cut
was mainly borne by tenants. Although the estimate of the incidence is not precisely
estimated, findings are consistent with Brewer et al. (2014) that estimate a 10 %
incidence on landlords using the same reform of this paper. 11 It is however very
different compared to the 60 % estimate in Gibbons and Manning (2006).
In Table 2.3 we replicate the analysis for two subgroups to check whether there is
heterogeneity in the incidence of the housing subsidy. The first subgroup are people
living in London where the reform had a larger impact due to the introduction of the
11The incidence is not precisely estimated regardless of using the two separate regression approach
or the instrumental variable strategy. The confidence interval of the incidence contains implausible
negative values.
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subsidy caps. Brewer et al. (2014) report that the average receipt in London fell by
£13.40 per week compared to £6.80 in Great Britain. In the London BRMAs where
the caps were binding the average receipt decreased by a much higher £41.90 per
week. The point estimate of the incidence in London is 45 %, although it lacks again
precision. This suggests that some negotiation between landlords and tenants took
place in areas where caps heavily affected subsidy receipts. The second subgroup are
recipients that moved to their current property at most 3 years before the interview.
The rational to analyse this group is that the subsidy cut might induce recipients to
rent cheaper properties leading to a higher incidence on landlords. Column (2) of
Table 2.3 however shows that this is not the case suggesting that other factors such
as the housing demand of other recipients or unsubsidised tenants prevented them
from finding a cheaper accommodation.
Table 2.3: Incidence of the Housing Subsidy in subgroups
London Recently Moved
Incidence 0.448 0.019
(−0.119; −0.019) (−0.580 ; 0.617)
N 1020 4091
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Confidence Intervals at 95 % in parentheses. Instrumen-
tal Variable approach. Cluster Robust Standard Errors at
BRMA level
Control variables: BRMA, subsidy rate a household is en-
titled to, survey dummy, shared accommodation with other
households, length of tenancy,type of dwelling, rural-urban
classification, house rented furnished, type of utility in-
cluded in the rent, age of the HRP, housing price index,
deprived area dummy, number of rooms, number of bed-
rooms, log-income, other benefits recipient, non-dependant
living in the household.
2.6.2 The incidence on unsubsidised tenants
We now estimate the incidence of the housing subsidy on non-recipients. Figure 2.4
shows rents of subsidised and unsubsidised tenants. The median rent of unsubsidised
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Figure 2.4: Median weekly Log(Rent) for subsidised and unsubsidised tenants in the
private rental market, Q2 2008- Q1 2014
 
Source: English Housing Survey and Family Resource Survey.
The two vertical lines mark the introduction of the LHA reform in April 2011 and the
full implementation of the reform in December 2012.
tenants was higher than the median rent of recipients through all the period, but
differences were minimal. Until the full implementation of the reform the trend for
both series was downward. However, rents paid by unsubsidised tenants began to
grow after January 2012, whereas rents were roughly constant for subsidy recipients.
The reform did not lower overall rents for claimants, so no effect is expected on
rents for unsubsidised tenants. Table 2.4 reports the effect of the reform on un-
subsidised tenants estimated using equation (2.17). Each line is the estimate of the
deviation from the pre-reform trend due to the three phases of the reform. Rents for
unsubsidised tenants fell by -0.3 % per week after 33 months the LHA reform was
implemented.12 Column (2) shows the estimates for the most deprived areas where
12The decrease in rents are obtained by multiplying the coefficients in Table 2.4 with the
number of the months elapsed since the reform was implemented. For example the de-
crease in rents in January 2013-33 months after the introduction of the reform- is 33*(-
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Table 2.4: Incidence of the Housing Subsidy on unsubsidised tenants
Log Rent Log Rent
All Sample Most Deprived Areas
First Reform -0.00032 -.00047
period (-0.0088 ; 0.00024) (-0.00163; 0.00068)
Second Reform 0.00021 -0.00004
period (-0.00029 ; 0.0072) (-0.00103; 0.00095)
Third Reform 0.00025 0.00056
period (-0.00013 ; 0.00063) (-0.00010 ; 0.00121)
Monthly time 0.00028 -0.00001
trend (-0.00067 ; 0.00124) (-0.00202 ; 0.00199)
N 16256 2702
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Confidence Intervals at 95 % in parentheses. Cluster Robust Standard
Errors at BRMA level.
Control variables: BRMA, , survey dummy, shared accommodation with
other households, length of tenancy,type of dwelling, rural-urban classifi-
cation, house rented furnished, type of utility included, in the rent, age
of the HRP, housing price index, deprived area dummy, number of rooms,
number of bedrooms, log-income, other benefits recipient, non-dependant
living in the households.
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a larger share of recipients are expected to live. Their rents fell by 1 % per week 33
months after the implementation of the reform.
Table 2.5: Differences in rents between subsidised and unsubsidised tenants
Log Rent
All Sample
Unsubsidised tenants -0.174***
(-0.205; -0.143)
Reform -0.007
(-0.043; 0.030)
Reform*Unsubsidised tenants 0.010
(-.016; .036)
Monthly time trend -0.0010
(-.0017; -.0003)
Monthly time trend*Unsubsidised tenants 0.0010
(.0003; .0018)
N 23330
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Confidence Intervals at 95 % in parentheses. Cluster Robust Standard Er-
rors at BRMA level.
Control variables: BRMA, , survey dummy, shared accommodation with
other households, length of tenancy,type of dwelling, rural-urban classifica-
tion, house rented furnished, type of utility included, in the rent, age of the
HRP, housing price index, deprived area dummy, number of rooms, number
of bedrooms, log-income, other benefits recipient, non-dependant living in
the households
To understand the small incidence on landlords, we supplement the analysis with an
equation that aims to explain the differences between rents paid by subsidised and
unsubsidised tenants. We pool together data on subsidised and unsubsidised tenants
and estimate the equation
lnRit = δ0 + δ1UTit + δ2tm + δ3tm ∗ UTit + δ4dit + δ5dit ∗ UTit + x′stφ+ ξst (2.18)
0.00032)+21*0.00021+0.00025*12=-0.003
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where UTit is a dummy that indicates whether tenant i is a subsidy recipient. Equa-
tion (2.18) allows for different trend in rents and impact of the reform between sub-
sidised and unsubsidised tenants. The price of property characteristics φ is assumed
constant among the two groups.
Table 2.5 shows that subsidy recipients pay on average 17 % more than unsubsidised
tenants for a property. The correlation between recipient status and unobserved
property characteristics can bias this estimate. However, it can be interpreted as an
indicator that landlords accept subsidised tenants only if they pay a premium to rent
their property. If the demand of unsubsidised tenants is high and recipients can be
easily replaced with other tenants, landlords can refuse to agree a discount to the
premium and ask recipients to pay the full rent.
2.7 Discussion
A considerable number of studies exploit housing subsidy reforms to scrutinize the
incidence on landlords of housing subsidies. The reported estimates vary between
10 % and 90 % but the reasons of the large heterogeneity in the estimates are not
discussed in the literature. A possible explanation for this range is that every reform
has been implemented in a specific rental market and housing subsidies differently
affect the housing demand and the decisions of claimants.
Fack (2006) assesses the impact of an early 90s reform in France that extended the
eligibility of housing subsidies to low-income singles, couples without children and
students. The reform sharply increased the housing demand for these new groups
of subsidised tenants. Students that lived with their parents and singles that shared
their accommodation with other tenants could claim support to rent an independent
accommodation. This substantial rise of the housing demand and the low response
of the supply led to only 22 % incidence on landlords. Kangasharju (2010) and Viren
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(2013) study the housing subsidies in Finland and find that the incidence on landlords
varies between one-third and 50 %. The housing subsidy programme in Finland is
peculiar because a share of the rents is always paid by claimants regardless of their
income and the payment is made directly to landlords. The reform implemented in
2002 increased the ceiling of the subsidy and accordingly landlords, that held infor-
mation on the amount of the subsidy, rose rents. ‘More recently, Eerola, Lyytika¨inen,
et al. (2017) estimate the incidence of housing subsidies exploiting discontinuities in
subsidy receipts at certain property size and property age thresholds. They find only
small differences in rents at the cut-offs in line with this study and Brewer et al.
(2014). Collinson and Ganong (2016) examine various housing voucher policies in
the US and find that the incidence on landlords is around 80-90 % for tenants that
remained in the same property and around 40 % when subsidy recipients moved to
a new property. The nominal price rigidity and the active role of the government in
bargaining rents with landlords could explain why prices did not soar when recipients
stayed in their property.
In the UK Gibbons and Manning (2006) estimate the incidence of the housing subsidy
using a reform implemented in the mid 90s. This reform cut the subsidy rates but it
did not affect recipients who claimed their subsidy before the reform. The fact that
Gibbons and Manning (2006) identify treated claimants as new tenancies that moved
to a new property might explain why they find that more than 60 % of the incidence
fell on landlords. 13 One factor that helps to understand the much lower incidence
found in this paper is the nominal rigidity in the short run. The LHA reform in
2011 reduced the generosity of the subsidy but unlike the reform in the mid 90s it
affected new and continuing tenancies. Tenants in multi-year contracts were not able
to move to a new property or negotiate a reduced price with landlords. Genesove
(2003) show that rents do not change for 29 % of the dwellings within a year and this
13Unlike recipients that stay in their properties, recipients that move to a new house have a
reservation price for moving that
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figure increases to 36 % for continuing tenants. This observation is supported by the
evidence in Collinson and Ganong (2016) with rents rising by only 9 cents per dollar
of subsidy for recipients that stayed in the same properties after a housing voucher
reform.
Figure 2.5: Dwelling stock by tenure in Great Britain, 1992-2014
Source: ONS.
If nominal rigidity might be the reason for the low incidence in continuing tenancies,
this does not explain why rents did not fall for affected claimants that recently moved
to a new property (see Table 2.3). 14 However, there are other important facts that
help to figure out the small incidence on landlords for this group. The first fact is the
sharp growth of the private rental market that started in 2004 and continued over
the period of the LHA reform (Figure 2.5).
This increase in the private rental market compensated for the decline in the social
14The assumption here is that claimants affected by the reform that moved to a new property
should rent cheaper dwellings to compensate the effect of the subsidy cut.
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Figure 2.6: Housing Subsidy (HS) Caseloads, 1992-2014
Source: Department for Work and Pensions.
housing sector and the more recent reduction in the home-ownership. The second
fact is that the number of subsidy claimants quickly rose in the private rental market
after the financial crisis in 2008 and stabilized in 2013 when the reform was fully
implemented (Figure 2.6). Therefore recipients that moved to a new property faced
the increase in the housing demand generated by unsubsidised tenants and new recip-
ients and they might have not had any bargaining power to negotiate a reduced rent
with landlords. These two facts did not occur in the mid 90s, the period analysed
in Gibbons and Manning (2006). The number of subsidy recipients started falling
when the reform was introduced in 1996 and in that period there was no additional
pressure from unsubsidised tenants. New subsidy recipients could therefore rent a
cheap property and share the burden of the subsidy cut with landlords.
Another important factor that determines the incidence of the subsidy is the housing
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Figure 2.7: Vacant Dwellings, 2004-2016
Source: Department for Communities and Local Government.
supply. In times of high housing demand, landlords could decide to move from the
subsidy recipient market to the unsubsidised tenant market. This fact is exacerbated
when recipients and non-recipients are not perceived as equivalent. Indeed, subsidy
recipients were associated with anti-social behaviour and rent arrears and only 50 %
of landlords were eager to let them a property (Private Landlords Survey 2010). The
LHA reform increased the reluctance of private landlords to accept claimants and
rose the number of evictions and not-renewal of tenancies (Support for housing costs
in the reformed welfare system, Fourth Report of Session ). In addition, the decline
in the number of vacant properties (Figure 2.7) could be an indicator of restrictions
in the housing supply and might be a further element to explain why the reform did
not reduce rents of subsidised and unsubsidised tenants.
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2.8 Conclusions
In 2011 the UK government implemented a housing subsidy reform with the aim of
reducing the welfare expenditure on housing and lowering rents in the private rental
market. The justification given by the UK government for this reform was that land-
lords were charging claimants by far more than a fair rent. However, this study shows
that the LHA reform did not significantly affect rents for subsidised and unsubsidised
tenants and the incidence of the subsidy was mostly on tenants. An explanation for
this finding might be the nominal rigidity of rents in the short run. Rents may not
adjust because rental contracts are typically renewed annually or on a multi-year
basis. In addition, claimants could not have enough bargaining power to obtain a
lower rent. This mainly applies in rental markets where the high housing demand
from unsubsidised tenants and new subsidy recipients outweighs the decrease in de-
mand due to a subsidy cut and landlords have preferences for letting to unsubsidised
tenants.
The findings of this paper are consistent with Brewer et al. (2014) but in contrast
with most of the literature on the incidence of the housing subsidy. In the UK con-
text, Gibbons and Manning (2006) use a reform in the mid 90s and find that the
incidence on landlords was 60 %, larger than the 7 % estimate of this paper or the
10 % in Brewer et al. (2014). However, their identification strategy and the housing
market in the mid 90s were very different. Indeed the reform exploited in Gibbons
and Manning (2006) affected only claimants that moved to new properties. Assuming
that rents they could afford depended on the reduced subsidy, they targeted on aver-
age cheaper houses. Secondly, the rental market in the mid 90s was not characterised
by an increase in the demand from unsubsidised tenants and new recipients.
From a policy perspective, it is important to bear in mind the unintended conse-
quences of the 2011 reform. If rents did not respond to the reform, subsidy recipients
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offset the subsidy cut by cutting consumption of other goods or increasing the labour
supply (as Jacob and Ludwig (2012) show in the US). However, a subsidy cut does
not only have an economic impact but it can also affect health of recipients. The
fear of losing house can indeed cause mental distress and increase the pressure on the
health system (Reeves, Clair, McKee, & Stuckler, 2016).
This paper has shown that cutting the housing subsidy is not enough to drive prices in
the rental market. A more effective policy could be incentivising the private construc-
tion of affordable houses in areas with high housing demand. A second important tool
could be increasing the bargaining power of subsidy recipients giving them support
when they negotiate a rental agreement.
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Appendix
B1 LHA regime status
Table B1: LHA regime status dit by month of the interview
Month of the interview Old Claimants New Claimants
Before LHA reform (Jan 2008-Apr 2011) 0 0
April 2011 0 1
May 2011 0 1
June 2011 0 1
July 2011 0 1
August 2011 0 1
September 2011 0 1
October 2011 0 1
November 2011 0 1
December 2011 0 1
January 2012 1/12 1
February 2012 2/12 1
March 2012 3/12 1
April 2012 4/12 1
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May 2012 5/12 1
June 2012 6/12 1
July 2012 7/12 1
August 2012 8/12 1
September 2012 9/12 1
October 2012 10/12 1
November 2012 11/12 1
December 2012 1 1
After LHA reform (Jan 2013-Dec 2014) 1 1
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B2 Equivalence between the IV estimator θ2 and
the two regressions approach
Define X as a N ×K matrix of the K − 1 exogenous independent variables and the
endogenous regressor (the subsidy S), Z a N ×K matrix of the K − 1 independent
variables and an instrument (the reform dummy d) and y a N × 1 vector of the
dependent variable rent.
The vector of parameters θ from the model 2.15 is obtained through the instrumental
variable (IV) estimator. θ is defined as
θ = (Z
′
X)−1Z
′
y = (Z
′
X)−1(Z
′
Z)(Z
′
Z)−1Z
′
y (2.19)
Since (Z
′
X)−1(Z
′
Z) = ((Z
′
Z)−1(Z
′
X))−1
(Z
′
X)−1(Z
′
Z)(Z
′
Z)−1Z
′
y = ((Z
′
Z)−1(Z
′
X))−1(Z
′
Z)−1Z
′
y (2.20)
θ2 is the coefficient associated to the endogenous regressor S and represents the in-
cidence on landlords of the subsidy. It is obtained by multiplying the second row of
the matrix ((Z
′
Z)−1(Z
′
X))−1 by (Z
′
Z)−1Z
′
y.
Define x a N × 1 vector of the endogenous variable S.
The ratio between the vector of parameters β from model 2.11 and α from model
2.12 is defined as
β
α
=
(Z
′
Z)−1Z
′
y
(Z ′Z)−1Z ′x
= ((Z
′
Z)−1Z
′
x))−1(Z
′
Z)−1Z
′
y (2.21)
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B3 Descriptive Statistics
Table B2: Descriptive statistics for LHA claimants in the pre- and post- reform
period, showing means and t-tests on the equality of means
Pre-Reform Post-Reform t-test
Log Rent per week 4.778 4.772 0.006
Log Housing Subsidy per week 4.452 4.354 0.098***
Shared Accomodation Rate 0.014 0.013 0.001
One Bedroom Rate 0.370 0.309 0.061***
Two Bedroom Rate 0.400 0.414 -0.014
Three Bedroom Rate 0.161 0.197 -0.036***
Four Bedroom Rate 0.041 0.052 -0.011**
Five Bedroom Rate 0.014 0.015 -0.000
Share Accomodation 0.007 0.007 0.000
Tenancy < 1 year 0.260 0.230 0.030***
1 year <= Tenancy < 2 years 0.189 0.164 0.026**
2 years <= Tenancy < 3 years 0.144 0.147 -0.002
3 years <= Tenancy < 5 years 0.143 0.174 -0.031***
5 years <= Tenancy < 10 years 0.138 0.180 -0.041***
Tenancy >= 10 years 0.124 0.105 0.019**
Detached House 0.052 0.052 -0.000
Semi Detached House 0.208 0.207 0.001
Terraced House 0.433 0.424 0.009
Flat 0.296 0.309 -0.014
Room 0.008 0.006 0.002
Couple with no Children 0.072 0.068 0.004
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Couple with Children 0.170 0.191 -0.021**
Lone Parents 0.370 0.387 -0.017
Single Aged 16 to 24 0.013 0.011 0.002
Single Aged 25 to 34 0.036 0.026 0.010**
Single Over 34 0.253 0.205 0.047***
Other Type of Family 0.087 0.113 -0.026***
HRP Age 16 t o24 0.119 0.093 0.026***
HRP Age 25 to 34 0.256 0.288 -0.031***
HRP Age 35 to 44 0.250 0.254 -0.004
HRP Age 45 to 54 0.150 0.158 -0.007
HRP Age 55 to 64 0.091 0.095 -0.004
HRP Age Over 64 0.133 0.113 0.020**
Furnished 0.118 0.092 0.026***
Partial Furnished 0.189 0.164 0.025**
Unfurnished 0.694 0.744 -0.050***
Male 0.388 0.385 0.003
Number of rooms 4.56 4.52 0.04
Number of bedrooms 2.31 2.35 -0.04
Log income 9.218 9.307 -0.089***
Non dependant in the household 0.128 0.165 -0.038***
Multiple deprivation index 0.292 0.285 0.007
Sample Size 4,170 2,292
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
The statistics regarding the proportion of subsidised tenants with a certain LHA rate are based on
the rules of the pre-reform system.
HRP is the Household Reference Person.
Log Income in 2008 prices.
The Multiple Deprivation is a binary variable that indicates whether the HB claimant lives in the 15
% (FRS data) or 20 % (EHS data) most deprived areas.
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Table B3: Descriptive statistics for unsubsidised tenants in the pre- and post- reform
period, showing means and t-tests on the equality of means
Pre-Reform Post-Reform t-test
Log Rent per week 4.76 4.79 -0.03***
Share Accomodation 0.099 0.059 0.040***
Tenancy < 1 year 0.379 0.370 0.009
1 year <= Tenancy < 2 years 0.216 0.183 0.033***
2 years <= Tenancy < 3 years 0.139 0.139 0.000
3 years <= Tenancy < 5 years 0.121 0.143 -0.022***
5 years <= Tenancy < 10 years 0.081 0.111 -0.030***
Tenancy >= 10 years 0.064 0.055 0.009**
Detached House 0.096 0.096 0.000
Semi Detached House 0.186 0.188 -0.002
Terraced House 0.328 0.335 -0.007
Flat 0.375 0.362 0.013
Room 0.013 0.014 -0.001
Couple with no Children 0.263 0.235 0.029***
Couple with Children 0.220 0.229 -0.009
Lone Parents 0.051 0.073 -0.022
Single Aged 16 to 24 0.034 0.044 -0.010***
Single Aged 25 to 34 0.079 0.084 -0.005
Single over 34 0.156 0.153 0.003
Other Type of Family 0.197 0.182 0.015**
HRP Age 16 to 24 0.154 0.128 0.026***
HRP Age 25 to 34 0.365 0.381 -0.016**
HRP Age 35 to 44 0.232 0.237 -0.005
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HRP Age 45 to 54 0.135 0.146 -0.011*
HRP Age 55 to 64 0.067 0.064 0.003
HRP Age over 64 0.048 0.043 0.005
Furnished 0.231 0.187 0.044***
Partial Furnished 0.189 0.171 0.018***
Unfurnished 0.579 0.642 -0.063***
Isolated 0.027 0.026 0.001
Male 0.648 0.628 0.020**
Number of rooms 4.620 4.530 0.090***
Number of bedrooms 2.38 2.35 0.03*
Log income 10.140 10.139 0.001
Non dependant in the household 0.100 0.146 -0.046***
Multiple deprivation index 0.172 0.156 0.016**
Sample Size 10,062 5,149
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
HRP is the Household Reference Person.
Log Income in 2008 prices.
The Multiple Deprivation is a binary variable that indicates whether the HB claimant
lives in the 15 % (FRS data) or 20 % (EHS data) most deprived areas.
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Chapter 3
What do we really know about the
employment effects of the National
Minimum Wage?
3.1 Introduction
The conduct of minimum wage policy in the UK is unusual for its very formal connec-
tion to an evidence base. Each year, a body called the Low Pay Commission (LPC),
which was established to advise the UK government on the setting of the NMW,
commissions and funds research on the impacts of the NMW, and then uses evidence
from those studies to help determine its recommendations to the government. Those
recommendations are almost always adopted. A broad conclusion from this body of
research has been that the introduction of the NMW and its subsequent up-ratings
has not had detrimental effects on employment (Stewart, 2004a,b; Dickens & Draca,
2005; Dickens, Riley, & Wilkinson, 2012; Bryan et al., 2013), with the LPC affirming
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in 2016 that:
The Low Pay Commission is generally thought to have succeeded in its
broad aims, ending extreme low pay, without damaging jobs or the wider
economy. Businesses have had to respond to a higher pay floor that some
have, on occasion, found uncomfortable – but the evidence set out in this
and in previous reports shows that they have generally adapted well.
In light of this evidence and the analysis of a report by the Office for Budget Re-
sponsibility (OBR, 2015)1, in 2016 the Government introduced the National Living
Wage, which rose the minimum wage rate for workers aged 25 or older by 7.5 %, and
set the target of the new rate at 60 % of the median earnings by 2020.
The NMW is often cited as a good example of policy that reduces inequality with
no adverse effect on employment (King, Anthony and Crewe, Ivor, 2014). However,
there are reasons to question whether the evidence base on the employment impact of
the UK NMW is as strong as its influence suggests. First, much of that literature is
based on difference-in-difference (DiD) designs (Stewart, 2004a,b; Dickens & Draca,
2005; Dickens et al., 2012; Bryan et al., 2013; Dickens, Riley, & Wilkinson, 2015). Re-
cent work has highlighted the challenges of conducting appropriate inference in such
designs (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004; Donald & Lang, 2007; Cameron,
Gelbach, & Miller, 2008) and, when inference is conducted properly, such designs
may have very low power (Brewer, Crossley, & Joyce, 2013). Second, the literature
on the NMW has focussed on the binary outcome of the statistical rejection of the
null hypothesis, without attention to the range of employment effects that are con-
sistent with the data. Commentators in both the social and medical sciences (such
as Cohen (1994), Sterne, Smith, and Cox (2001), Ziliak and McCloskey (2004) and
Ioannidis (2005)) have long noted that an excessive focus on rejecting or failing to
1The OBR report in July 2015 forecast a 1.1 million growth in employment by 2020 and a
minimal impact on employment of the NLW estimated at only 60,000 job loss.
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reject a null hypothesis can result in a very misleading interpretation of the statisti-
cal evidence. One of the recommendations of the American Statistical Association’s
statement is that researchers present confidence intervals, as this summarises what
values of the parameters of interest would be rejected (in a statistical sense) by this
data (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016).
In this paper we re-evaluate the employment effects of the UK’s NMW taking full
account of these concerns. We use the two most common specifications/approaches
in the literature. One estimates the impact of the NMW on transitions from employ-
ment using a DiD-style design. Examples of studies using this approach are Stewart
(2004a,b), Dickens and Draca (2005), Dickens et al. (2012), Bryan et al. (2013) and
Dickens et al. (2015). These studies typically estimate the impact that an up-rating
of the NMW has on the transition rate from employment into non-employment by
comparing outcomes for a treatment group of employees directly affected by a NMW
uprating with outcomes for workers in a control group that are located slightly higher
up the wage distribution. The other exploits geographical variation in the bite of the
living wage that arises because the minimum wage is set for the whole of the UK.
Exemplars of this approach are Stewart (2002), Dolton, Bondibene, and Wadsworth
(2012) and Dolton, Bondibene, and Stops (2015). In these studies, the employment
rate in a region is related to the bite of the minimum wage within that region; Dolton
et al. (2015) tackle comprehensively how best to account also for the state of the re-
gional labour market, the endogeneity of the level of the minimum wage, and spatially
or temporally correlated errors.
We develop previous findings in four ways. First, we follow recent suggestions for
best practice for undertaking inference in DiD designs. Second, we focus explicitly
on confidence intervals, rather than reporting p-values or focusing on the binary
outcome of whether the null hypothesis of “no impact of the NMW on employment”
can be rejected; this means we show, given appropriate inference techniques, what
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magnitude of effects can be ruled out given the available data. Third, we show
what the estimated coefficients mean for economically-meaningful concepts, such as
elasticities of employment with respect to the minimum wage. Finally, we calculate
minimum detectable effects (MDEs), following Bloom (1995), which indicate how
large the true employment effects would have to be (or how large would the true
labour demand elasticity have to be) for the methods employed in this literature to
detect them with high probability.
The existing literature has consistently failed to reject the null hypotheses that the
UK’s NMW wage has no impact on employment or job retention. This study is no
different (so, like the past literature, we fail to routinely find a “statistically significant
effect”). However, we show that the data cannot exclude large negative (and also
small positive) effects. Our preferred specification for implementing the approach,
in which we follow the recent literature on inference in DiD designs and calculate
the standard errors using methods designed to ensure that associated tests have the
correct size, gives a 95 % confidence interval within which a 10 percent rise in the
NMW could lower the job retention rate for NMW workers by as much as twenty-
two percent (or reduce it by as much as 0.5 percent). Considered another way, our
calculations of MDEs indicate that the tests and data employed in the literature
would have only an eighty percent chance of detecting a non-zero impact of the
NMW if the true effect of a ten percent increase in the NMW was to decrease the job
retention rate of NMW workers by no less than sixteen percent. We also highlight that
this commonly-used specification is not informative about the underlying elasticity
of employment with respect to the minimum wage, because it relates employment
rates to changes in, not levels of, the NMW. 2 The second empirical strategy does
provide an estimate of the underlying elasticity of employment with respect to the
minimum wage. Having such an estimate is important, not least because it allows
2We therefore think the back of the envelope calculation in the concluding section of Dickens et
al. (2015) is incorrect.
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for comparison with the rest of the literature. Here, we show that the power of this
design is low and so minimum detectable effects are large.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the most important
features of the UK NMW and past literature related to it with an emphasis on
why this research has been influential on LPC and Government. Section 3 describes
the empirical strategies that we use to revise the evidence on UK NMW. Section 4
presents and discusses our findings. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 The minimum wage in the UK3
The UK’s National Minimum Wage (NMW) was introduced on the 1st of April 1999,
and it covers all workers who are not self-employed, regardless of industry, size of firm,
occupation and region. The adult rate (for workers aged 22 or over) was set at £3.60
per hour, the rate for workers aged between 18 and 21 was £3.00, whereas a “trainee”
level for adults who received an accredited training in the first six months of a new
work was set at £3.20. Apprentices, workers on a government scheme under age 19
and young workers aged 16-17 were initially exempt. A year before the introduction
of the NMW, the coverage of the adult rate was around 5.6% and the youth rate was
estimated to affect 8.2% workers aged 18-21. 4 After a month from the introduction
of the NMW, the vast majority of employers were meeting their obligation to pay the
proper hourly rate (LPC Report 2000).
3This section is drawn on Low Pay Commission Report 1998, Lourie (1999), Coats (2007), Finn
(2005).
4Coverage of the NMW is defined as the proportion of employees in working age paid below the
NMW in April preceding the NMW review. Coverage estimates are calculated using Annual Survey
of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) data. ASHE is conducted in April of each year.
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Table 3.1: The UK National minimum wage for adults
Date Adult NMW Coverage AWE Inflation
rate % change growth
Apr 1999 £3.60 - 5.61 - -
Oct 2000 £3.70 2.78 2.98 - 1.2
Oct 2001 £4.10 10.81 5.03 4.5 1.1
Oct 2002 £4.20 2.44 3.76 2.7 1.4
Oct 2003 £4.50 7.14 4.21 4.0 1.5
Oct 2004 £4.85 7.78 5.87 5.3 1.2
Oct 2005 £5.05 4.12 5.23 4.0 2.3
Oct 2006 £5.35 5.94 6.23 4.3 2.4
Oct 2007 £5.52 3.18 5.59 4.4 2.1
Oct 2008 £5.73 3.80 5.76 3.5 4.4
Oct 2009 £5.80 1.22 4.01 0.2 1.5
Oct 2010 £5.93 2.24 5.05 2.0 3.2
Oct 2011 £6.08 2.53 6.23 2.2 5.0
Oct 2012 £6.19 1.81 5.81 1.1 2.6
Oct 2013 £6.31 1.94 6.22 1.1 2.2
Oct 2014 £6.50 3.01 7.28 2.1 1.3
Oct 2015 £6.70 3.08 7.63 2.1 -0.1
Apr 2016 £7.20 7.46 - 1.8 -0.1
Apr 2017 £7.50 4.17 - - -
The adult rate refers to workers aged 22 and over until 2009 and aged 21 and
over afterwards. In April 2016 the National Living Wage replaced the National
Minimum Wage for workers aged 25 and over. NMW change, Coverage, AWE
growth and Inflation are expressed as percentages. Earnings in ASHE are recorded
in April every year. Coverage in 1999 is relative to earnings recorded in April 1998.
Sources: Low Pay Commission, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE),
CPI series D7BT (ONS), Average Weekly Earnings (ONS) series KAB9.
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Figure 3.1: Annual growth rates of the UK National Minimum Wage, 2000 to 2015.
Sources: Low Pay Commission, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), Aver-
age Weekly Earnings (ONS) series KAB9.
The level of the NMW is reviewed annually (and we describe this process in more
detail below), with the government announcing each Spring the rate that will apply
from the following October. Table 3.1 shows the history of the NMW up-ratings.
In the first years after its introduction, the government announced sizeable increases
in the NMW: the adult rate rose by nearly 11% in October 2001, and by between
7 and 8% in both 2003 and 2004, at a time when Average Weekly Earnings (AWE)
increased by just 4 to 5%. Since the onset of the financial crisis and subsequent
downturn, although upratings have not always kept pace with inflation, they have
largely outpaced growth in average earnings. Coverage of the adult NMW rate has
been most of the years between 4 and 6% of the employees in working age with a
slightly increasing trend over time.
In April 2016 the government applied a new rate to workers aged 25 and above,
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increasing the minimum hourly wage by 7.5%. With this change, the NMW was
relabelled as the National Living Wage (NLW) and the government announced a
target of setting the NLW at 60% of median earnings by 2020 (LPC Report 2016).
These are much larger changes than those between 1999 and 2016 but the decision of
the NLW introduction was taken on the basis of the evidence that the NLW would
not harm employment and partly to limit the Work Tax Credit outlays.
3.2.2 Research on the impact of the National Minimum
Wage
A considerable number of studies have examined whether the NMW has affected
employment. Typically, these have made use either of the period just before and
after the introduction of the minimum wage, or the variations over time in the level
of the minimum wage caused by the annual changes shown in Table 3.1. Two main
approaches have been commonly employed in this research. The first approach uses
individual panel data and estimates the effect of a change in the NMW on job reten-
tion.5 The second strategy relies on the regional variation of the NMW impact on
the wage distribution and estimates the effect of the minimum wage on employment
rate.
The studies that examine the impact of the NMW on job retention use a Difference-
in-Differences (DiD) design, typically comparing workers whose wage is increased
to comply with the NMW with an unaffected group of workers with higher wages.
This is done because it allows researchers to identify a group of employees who will
be directly affected by a change in the NMW; the main alternative to this is to
look at employment rates amongst groups of individuals likely to be affected by the
minimum wage were they to work, such as young low-skilled adults.6 For example,
5Job retention is defined as the probability of making a transition out of employment
6Machin, Manning, and Rahman (2003) and Machin and Wilson (2004) examine the impact
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Stewart (2004b) assesses the impact of the introduction of the NMW on job retention
with a DiD design, comparing job retention probabilities of the group who have an
initial wage below the 1999 NMW (the treatment group) with a group who earn
a slightly higher wage (the control group). He used three different data sources
- the Labour Force Survey Data (LFS), the British Household Panel Survey Data
(BHPS) and the New Earnings Survey (NES), now known as the Annual Survey of
Hours and Earnings (ASHE) - all with their own strengths and weaknesses. Stewart
reports mostly positive, but statistically insignificant, effects of the NMW on job
retention across all data-sets; only for women, and only in some specifications, does
he find disemployment effects of the NMW, and these are statistically insignificant.
A companion paper, Stewart (2004a), extends this analysis to the 2000 and 2001
upratings. Again, the study does not find any statistically significant effect of the
two subsequent upratings on job retention probabilities.
Dickens and Draca (2005) examine the employment effects of the 2003 minimum
wage uprating. The authors find no statistically significant effects on employment,
although they note that the 2003 uprating affects fewer workers than previous uprat-
ings, which they helpfully note diminishes the power of the analysis. Dickens et al.
(2012) analyse the NMW effects on employment using individual data and exploiting
geographical variation in the bite of the national minimum wage. Using the NES,
they find that the introduction of the minimum wage may have had a small negative
impact on job retention for women working part-time. However, their conclusions
are not consistent across specifications, and are not confirmed using the LFS.
Bryan et al. (2013) provide one of the most comprehensive assessments, as the authors
estimate the effect on job retention of each of the NMW upratings from 2000 to
2011. They extend the previous DiD design by not only comparing individuals who
of the NMW on workers employed in residential or nursing care homes, a sector with very high
incidence of low rates of pay. They find some evidence of disemployment effects.
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were directly affected by a NMW increase to those who earned slightly more (as in
Stewart (2004b)), but also comparing job retention rates over periods that do, and
do not, span the annual October increase in the NMW: the idea is that retention
rates measured over a period that spans October are potentially affected by the
NMW uprating, and retention rates measured over a period that does not span
October are not affected by any NMW uprating. They find a statistically significant
detrimental effect for the 2001 uprating - corresponding to the largest year-on-year
increase observed to date, with a rise of over 10% - for men. For some specifications,
they also obtain positive coefficients for the 2006 and the 2011 upratings, but the
statistical significance of these is not robust across specifications.
Dickens et al. (2015) use a DiD design that compares job retention rates of workers
affected by the minimum wage and job retention rates of a group of workers with
a pay that is slightly higher the forthcoming NMW in a period when the NMW
was enacted (1999-2010) and in a base period that precedes the minimum wage
introduction (1994-1997). Findings suggest that the NMW reduces job retention and
in particular harms part-time women whose job retention decreases by 3 percentage
points.
The second of the two approaches focuses on the impact of the NMW on employment
rate and exploits the fact that the minimum wage is set at the national level, but the
wage distribution varies across local areas. This strategy assumes that the bite of
the minimum wage on employment is larger in areas where the increase of the NMW
has an important impact on the wage distribution relative to areas where only few
workers are affected by a change in the minimum wage.
In the UK the first exemplar of this type of studies is Stewart (2002). In his paper
he reformulates the model proposed in Card (1992) and estimates a reduced form
equation that derives from a structural model of the labour demand. Local area
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employment changes are explained by the wage variation due to the different impact
of the introduction of the NMW across local areas. Stewart (2002) uses the share
of workers paid below the minimum wage rate in a local area as an instrument
for the endogenous wage variation. He reports positive and negative employment
elasticities but none of them is statistically significant at conventional levels. In a
second specification, Stewart (2002) uses an indicator for areas with the highest share
of workers paid below the NMW as alternative instrument for the endogenous wage
variation but findings do not lead to different conclusions.
Dolton et al. (2012) examine the effect of the minimum wage on employment with
an incremental Difference-in Differences design. They compare employment in a
period when the NMW was in place with employment before the NMW introduction
regressing the employment rate at local area level on the Kaitz Index -a measure
of the bite of the minimum wage on the wage distribution in the local area- area
fixed effects and other area characteristics. The Kaitz Index is also interacted with
an indicator for the annual NMW uprating allowing for an effect of the minimum
wage that changes over time. Interestingly, Dolton et al. (2012) find positive and
statistically significant effects of the minimum wage over the years 2004-2006.
Dolton et al. (2015) is the most recent study of the second approach and revisits the
incremental Difference-in Differences in Dolton et al. (2012) adding some important
contributions. They first present the same static model as in Dolton et al. (2012)
but they control for regional aggregate demand shocks and spatial dependence in
the error terms to account for common shocks that affect contiguous areas. Then
they implement a dynamic model that includes a lag of the employment rate in
the regressors applying the System GMM IV estimator to deal with the possible
endogeneity of the Kaitz Index. Dolton et al. (2015) stress that the incremental
Difference-in Differences design disentangles the (negative) underlying effect of the
minimum wage and the (positive) effect of the annual upratings. They claim that
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this divergent effect explain why the literature has found a detrimental effect of the
introduction of the minimum wage but also some null or positive effects when a longer
period is brought in the analysis.
The research summarised above has had an unusually large influence on policy be-
cause of the institutional structure around the NMW, and the particular role played
by a body known as the Low Pay Commission (LPC). The LPC is a statutory body,
independent of government, and exists to advise the government about policy towards
the NMW (it is not responsible for enforcement). As discussed earlier, the decisions
about the level of the NMW are made on an annual cycle. The LPC produces a set
of recommendations each year (usually in February), including a recommendation
on by how much the NMW should increase, and the government makes its decision
later in the Spring, with the new NMW rate applying from the following October.
7 Although the government is not obliged to accept its recommendations, successive
UK governments have, since 1999, mostly followed the LPC’s advice on by how much
to increase the NMW in each year.
And it is the LPC that provides the link between research and policy decisions, as
the LPC’s recommendations are heavily based on its reading of the research evidence.
The LPC has a continuous programme of monitoring and evaluation of the NMW,
and in each year since its inception, it has directly commissioned a considerable
volume of research on the impacts (in a broad sense) of the UK NMW; typically
commissioning some 6-10 projects each year, the results which are published alongside
their recommendations to government. Speaking in 2007, the incoming Chairman of
the LPC, Paul Myners, declared that his predecessors “established a way of working
within the Commission based on partnership, openness and a respect for evidence.
I am determined that, under my chairmanship, the Commission will continue to be
7In April 2016 the UK government introduced the National Living Wage, the minimum hourly
rate for workers aged 25 and over. Since then the NLW and the other rates for young workers are
reviewed in April.
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evidence-driven.” (LPC Report 2007).
The research on the effect of the NMW on employment has typically failed to reject
the null that the NMW has had no impact on employment, or on job retention
probabilities. Crucially, though, this “failure to reject the null” has been interpreted
in policy circles as “evidence of no adverse impact”. For example, in the LPC’s 2003
report, the then-chairman stated that:
The National Minimum Wage has brought benefits to over one million
low-paid workers. It has done so without any significant adverse impact
on business or employment. Far from having the dire consequences which
some predicted, the minimum wage has been assimilated without major
problems even though it has been a challenge for some businesses. It has
ceased to be a source of controversy and become an accepted part of our
working life. LPC Report 2003.
In 2006, the LPC said that
since its introduction in 1999 the minimum wage has been a major
success. It has significantly improved the wages of many low earners;
it has helped improve the earnings of many low-income families; and it
has played a major role in narrowing the gender pay gap. But it has
achieved this without significant adverse effects on business or employment
creation. (LPC Report 2006).
Finally, in their 2009 report, the LPC concluded that “a large volume of research
has demonstrated that the minimum wage has not had a significant impact on either
measures (unemployment and wage inflation) over its first ten years.”
And this impression about the benign impact of the NMW on employment is, in
general, shared by government. In 2001, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
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at the time said that “the second report of the LPC, published in February 2000,
looked at these matters but found no indication so far of significant effects on the
economy as a whole as a result of the introduction of the national minimum wage.”
(House of Commons Debates,15 May 2000 : Column: 26W ). Announcing the 2004
uprating, the Prime Minister at the time said: “Some people said unemployment
would go up as a result of the minimum wage. Actually we have one-and-three-
quarter million more jobs in the British economy as well.”
Of course, these UK policy-makers are not alone in wrongly interpreting a p-value of
more than 0.05 as strong evidence in favour of a null hypothesis (Sterne et al., 2001).
As Cohen (1994) observes, what policy-makers want to know is how likely is it, given
the available data, that policy does not have an adverse effect (i.e. P (H0|D)); what
a p-value tells us is how extreme the data is if the null hypothesis was true (i.e.
P (D|H0)). Furthermore, as Ziliak and McCloskey (2004) argue, we should consider
the magnitude of effects when interpreting findings, in order to establish whether
findings are economically significant. In the case of the NMW, we might want to
know not whether we can reject the null of “the NMW has no effect on employment”,
but whether we can reject the null of “the NMW has economically-meaningful large
negative impacts on employment”.
3.3 Data and Models
Our approach is motivated by two concerns. First, we contend that too much weight
has been placed on a body of research that has mostly failed to reject the null hy-
pothesis that “the NMW has no effect on employment”, with policy-makers wrongly
interpreting p-values as telling us how likely it is that the NMW does have an adverse
effect on employment. Second, this literature has employed difference-in-difference
(DiD) designs, even though there are significant challenges in conducting appropriate
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inference in such designs, and they can have very low power when inference is con-
ducted appropriately. Our hypothesis is that the existing research has under-stated
the statistical imprecision of its key parameter estimates.
We proceed by estimating a model very similar to that in Bryan et al. (2013), one
of the most recent and comprehensive studies on the impact of the NMW on em-
ployment, and commissioned by the LPC for their 2013 report. Our identification
strategy and data are the same as in Bryan et al. (2013), but we depart from that
study’s approach - and that of previous studies cited in Section 2 - in four ways. First,
we follow recent suggestions for best practice for undertaking inference in difference-
in-difference designs, and show that the standard errors estimated in (some of the)
previous UK literature - although we do not make this claim about Dolton et al.
(2015) - are downward-biased. Second, we focus explicitly on confidence intervals,
rather than reporting p-values or focusing on the binary outcome of whether the
null hypothesis of no impact of the NMW on employment can be rejected. Third,
we show what the estimated coefficients mean for economically-meaningful concepts
such as labour demand elasticities. Finally, we calculate minimum detectable effects
(Bloom, 1995), which indicate how large the true employment effects would have to
be (or how large would the true labour demand elasticity have to be) for the methods
employed in this literature to detect them with high probability.
3.3.1 Two approaches for assessing the impact of the
NMW on employment
In this paper we re-evaluate the employment effects of the UK’s NMW taking full
account of these concerns, and using the two most common specifications/approaches
in the literature. One estimates the impact of the NMW on transitions from employ-
ment using a DiD-style design, and the other exploits geographical variation in the
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bite of the minimum wage. We describe these two approaches below.
3.3.1.1 Estimating the impact of the NMW on employment transitions
using difference-in-differences
Studies following this approach typically estimate the impact that an uprating of the
NMW has on the transition rate from employment into non-employment by compar-
ing outcomes for a treatment group of employees directly affected by a NMW uprating
with outcomes for workers in a control group that are located slightly higher up the
wage distribution. Examples of studies using this approach are Stewart (2004a,b),
Dickens and Draca (2005) and Dickens et al. (2012), Bryan et al. (2013), Dickens et
al. (2015).
We proceed by describing the model set out in Bryan et al. (2013), which we choose
as a recent example of the method: much of what we say below applies to the
other examples cited above. This estimates the impact of changes in the NMW
on employment transitions with a multi-group, multi-period, difference-in-differences
(DiD) design.
The model is estimated on data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), which is com-
parable to the Current Population Survey (CPS) in the US, and collects information
on employment status and other issues for a sample of the UK population. Indi-
viduals in the LFS are surveyed in five consecutive quarters, but, as information on
earnings is asked only in the first and in the last interview and we need to measure
earnings at the beginning of the period over which we measure employment transi-
tions, the outcome measure is an individual’s transition from employment over a 6
month period using the first and the third observation for each individual. These
6-month intervals either do or do not straddle a NMW increase on 1 October; this is
denoted with s. The maintained assumption by the literature is that retention rates
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measured over a period that spans 1 October are potentially affected by a NMW
uprating, and retention rates measured over a period that does not span 1 October
are not affected by any NMW uprating.8 Individuals are allocated into one of four
different groups, g, according to the starting wage: the treatment group is composed
of workers who earn a wage wit between the existent NMW enforced in year t and
the upcoming year t+1 NMW uprating (NMWt ≤ wit < NMWt+1), and individuals
in the control group have a salary that is slightly higher than the upcoming year
t + 1 NMW (NMWt+1 ≤ wit < m(NMWt+1); we set m = 1.1, so workers in our
control group earn up to 10% more than the year t upcoming NMW up-rating. There
is also a Below NMW group that contains people who report an hourly wage wit
below the existent NMW (wit < NMWt), and an Above NMW group that is made
up of workers paid more than m times the upcoming NMW (wit ≥ m(NMWt+1)).
The specification allows their wage to be affected by changes to the NMW, but the
impacts on these groups is allowed to be different from that on the treatment group.
The equation that is estimated is:
yigts = δts + αgt + βgtdgs + x
′
igtsγ + igts (3.1)
i = 1, ..., N ; g = C,B, T,A; s = 0, 1; t = 2000, ..., 2011
where yigts is a dummy variable that records whether individuals in work at time
t are also in work 6 months later, g subscripts the 4 groups defined according to
the individual’s initial wage, s denotes whether the 6-month intervals straddle a
NMW increase on 1 October, δts is an interaction of the year and whether or not the
transition straddles a NMW increase, αgt is a time-varying group effect, dgs is a binary
policy variable that denotes whether the observation is affected by a minimum wage
8As NMW increases happened always on 1 October in the period we consider, 6-month transi-
tions from Q1 to Q3 and from Q4 to Q2 do not span an uprating, and transitions from Q2 to Q4
and from Q3 to Q1 do.
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uprating (this varies by group g and whether the transition spans a NMW increase
on 1 October, s), and x are individual-level control variables. βTt can be interpreted
as the impact on job retention for the treatment group of the year t NMW up-rating
effect.
An alternative specification estimates the impact of a 1% rise in the NMW on job
retention. The motivation for this is the large variation in the growth rate of the
NMW: in 2001, the NMW rose by 10.8%, nine times as much as the rise in 2010 of
1.2%. In this alternative specification, we multiply the binary policy variable dgs by
the percentage change in the NMW at time t, ωt. This alternative model is:
yigts = δts + αgt + βgtdgsωt + x
′
igtsγ + igts (3.2)
i = 1, ..., N ; g = C,B, T,A; s = 0, 1; t = 2000, ..., 2011
where βTt is now the estimated impact of a 1% rise in the NMW at time t on job
retention.
We replicate the sample and point estimates described in Bryan et al. (2013), but we
estimate different standard errors, following concerns raised in the literature about
the accuracy of the inference in DiD designs when using the na¨ıve estimates of the
standard errors provided by OLS. The first concern, dating back to Moulton (1990),
relates to the grouped error structure. In DiD designs, the error term igts in Equation
3.1 is unlikely to be i.i.d., because an individual may have unobservable characteristics
that are correlated with other individuals of the same group, or may be affected by
common group shocks. In the case of these studies of the minimum wage, members
of the treatment group are all located at the bottom of the wage distribution, and so
it is highly plausible that they may have some common unobservable characteristics
(low ability, low skills, etc.) or are influenced by the same economic shocks. As far as
we have been able to work out, none of the research cited in Section 2 addresses this
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issue: most studies use heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, but do not allow for
any dependence between different individuals. A second concern, as initially noted
by Bertrand et al. (2004), is that the level of uncertainty surrounding the estimated
policy effect in DiD designs will likely be increased by positive serial correlation in the
group-time shocks, as the variable of interest in DiD designs is itself highly serially-
correlated. We describe our approach in further details in Appendix C1.
An approach that is commonly used to calculate standard errors that account for
the common group structure in the error term is the Donald and Lang (2007) two-
step estimator. When we calculate the standard errors with the Donald and Lang
(2007) approach equations 3.1 and 3.2 are exactly identified. This requires to place
restrictions in the two models and we constraint the impact of the NMW for the
treatment group on job retention βT to be time-invariant (further details in Appendix
C1). The constrained version of the model that estimates the impact of a NMW
uprating on job retention is
yigts = δts + αg + βgdgs + x
′
igtsγ + igts (3.3)
i = 1, ..., N ; g = C,B, T,A; t = 2000, ..., 2011
and the amended model that estimates the impact of a 1% NMW rise on job retention
is
yigts = δts + αg + βgdgsωt + x
′
igstγ + igst (3.4)
i = 1, ..., N ; g = C,B, T,A; t = 2000, ..., 2011
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3.3.1.2 Estimating the impact of the NMW on employment transitions
using geographical variation in its bite
The second approach arises because the minimum wage is set for the whole of the UK
but the impact or as commonly named in this literature the “bite” of the NMW on
the wage distribution varies across geographic areas of the country (Stewart, 2002;
Dolton et al., 2012; Dolton et al. 2015). This approach is based on the idea that a
larger effect of the NMW on employment is expected in areas where a change in the
minimum wage significantly affects the wage distribution compared to more thriving
areas where fewer workers earn the minimum rate.
We follow Dolton et al. (2015), the most recent study of this strand with a compelling
econometric strategy that accounts for the state of the regional labour market, the
endogeneity of the level of the minimum wage and spatially or temporally correlated
errors. The effect of the NMW on employment rate at local area level 9 is estimated
applying an incremental DiD design that compares a period with annual increases of
the minimum wage to a period prior to the introduction of the NMW. The variable
that measures the bite of the minimum wage on employment of a local area j is the
Kaitz index Kjt, the ratio of the NMW to the median wage of the local area j.
10 If
the index is nearly 1, the NMW has a strong impact on the wage distribution and
possibly on employment of the local area j. Conversely, a small value of the index is
an indicator that the wage distribution doesn’t significantly vary with the NMW.
To calculate the employment rate at local area level and the Kaitz index, Dolton et al.
(2015) use two sources of data: the employment rate is derived from the LFS and the
Kaitz index is calculated using data from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
9Dolton et al. (2015) report two distinct definitions of local area, the 140 unitary authorities
and counties and the 138 travel-to-work areas. Our findings are derived from Dolton et al. (2015)’s
estimates that use travel-to-work as definition of local area. Our conclusions do not change when
local areas are the unitary authorities and counties.
10The Kaitz index in the years preceding the introduction of the NMW is calculated deflating
the 1999 NMW by the wage inflation.
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(ASHE). The model that estimates the relationship between the two variables is
Ejt = pi0 + Aj + pit
t∑
k=1999
Ik + θ0Kjt + θt
t∑
k=1999
IkKjt + x
′
jtρ+ jt (3.5)
t = 1997, ..., 2010; j = 1, ..., 138
where Ejt is the log of the employment rate in the local area j at time t, Aj is the area
fixed effect, Ik is a set of year dummies from the introduction of the NMW in 1999, xjt
are a set of time-varying area characteristics. To overcome any spurious correlation
between the business cycle and the NMW, the model controls for a measure of the
regional aggregate demand at a geographic level broader than the local area defined
for employment and Kaitz index. Two parameters identify the effect of the NMW:
θ0 captures the time-invariant effect of the existence of a minimum rate and θt picks
up the additional effect of the annual uprating on employment rate.
The model allows for correlation between error terms of different local areas. This
is to account for spatial correlation generated by commuting patterns and common
economic shocks that influence contiguous areas. The error jt is a weighted average
of contemporaneous errors of the other local areas: 11
jt = λ
138∑
i=1
wijit + νjt
t = 1997, ..., 2010; j = 1, ..., 138; i = 1, ..., 138; i 6= j
where weights wij measure the strength of the economic relationship between local
areas.
A second specification addresses the possible endogeneity of the Kaitz index adding
a dynamic component. The minimum wage and accordingly the Kaitz index are
endogenous whether the UK government sets the minimum rate according to past
11Spatial Error Model (SEMP, Elhorst, 2010)
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shocks of employment or any omitted variable correlated with employment. The
dynamic model attempts to overcome this issue controlling for the lag of the em-
ployment rate at local area level Ejt−1. The formal equation of the dynamic model
is
Ejt = γEjt−1 + pi0 + Aj + pit
t∑
k=1999
Ik + θ0Kjt + θt
t∑
k=1999
IkKjt + x
′
jtρ+ jt (3.6)
t = 1997, ..., 2010; j = 1, ..., 138
The model is estimated with the System of Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM)
to cope with the common issue in the dynamic models of the endogeneity arised by
the inclusion of the lag dependent variable in the regressors (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988;
Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995). The SGMM estimator uses
lags of levels and differences of the endogenous variables as instruments. Dolton et
al. (2015) consider lags of levels and differences of employment rate and some area
characteristics as pre-determined instruments and obtain robust estimates and correct
standard errors implementing a two step SGMM procedure with the Windmeijer
correction (Windmeijer, 2005).
3.3.2 Minimum detectable effects
Following Bloom (1995) and Brewer et al. (2013), we use the concept of Minimum
Detectable Effects (MDEs) as a way of illustrating the power of the research designs
that have been used to study the impact of the UK’s NMW on employment. The
MDE combines the concepts of significance level α and power pi with the standard
error of the parameter of interest β, and is the smallest true effect that would lead a
test with size α to reject the null hypothesis of no treatment with a certain probability
pi. We can view high values of the MDE as suggesting that the estimator is low
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powered, whereas low values show that the analyst should be able to detect even
small effects with a certain probability pi. The MDE is defined as
MDE(x) =
ˆ
se(βˆ)[c1−α/2 − pt1−x]
where sˆe(βˆ) is the estimated standard error for the coefficient βˆ, cu is the critical
value of the (1 − α/2)-th percentile of the tC−1 distribution and pt1−x is the (1 −
x)th percentile of the t-statistic under the null hypothesis of no treatment effect.
The formula makes clear that either large standard errors, or a “high” threshold for
determining statistical significance (i.e. a low value of α) both lead to large MDEs.12
3.3.3 From the impact of the minimum wage on job
retention to employment demand elasticities
Studies of the minimum wage effect on employment implement different approaches
and report estimates that are rarely comparable. To facilitate comparisons between
studies we translate the estimated coefficients from Equations 3.1-3.6 into their im-
plied elasticities.
For the Dolton et al. (2015), this is straightforward: because equation 3.5 relate log-
employment to the Kaitz index Kjt, the resulting employment elasticity with respect
to the minimum wage at time t calculated at the median wage in the static model
(derivation in Appendix C2.1) is
η¯ER(t) = (θ0 + θt)K¯t (3.7)
12For the Bryan et al. (2013) method, our implementation of this notes that C is the number of
cells in our second stage (i.e. 80), and a standard value for pi in the literature is 0.8, so pt1−x turns
into the 20th percentile of a t-distribution with 79 degrees of freedom.
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In the dynamic model the employment elasticity (derivation in Appendix C2.2) is
η¯ER(t) =
θ0 + θt
(1− γ) · K¯t (3.8)
The employment elasticity in the dynamic model differs from the static model for
a scale factor 1 − γ - a measure of how much past employment affects current em-
ployment. A strong relation between current employment and previous employment
implies a larger employment elasticity.
For the Bryan et al. (2013) method, we turn our estimates of the impact of the NMW
on 6-month retention rates βT into an estimate of the elasticity of the 6-month job
retention rate to the NMW. This elasticity, ηJR, is defined in the usual way:
ηJR = ∆RR/RR/∆NMW/NMW (3.9)
For the model in which we estimate the average impact of a NMW up-rating, then
∆RR is the coefficient βT (i.e. the change in the retention rate for the treatment
group thanks to an increase in the NMW), RR is the counterfactual retention rate
(i.e. the proportion of workers who would have remained in employment if the NMW
had not been changed, which we can calculate as the observed retention rate less
βT )
13, and ∆NMW/NMW is 0.049, the average size of the NMW upratings in the
2000-2010 period. 14
A considerable drawback of the specifications in equations 3.1-3.4 , though, is that
one cannot infer from them what is the underlying relationship between the level
of the NMW and the level of the employment rate (or even the retention rate). To
calculate an elasticity of employment with respect to the wage or to the minimum
13We estimate the counterfactual job retention probability RR to be 0.875 for men and 0.902 for
women.
14For the model in which we estimate the impact of a 1 % rise in the NMW, then ∆RR is the
coefficient βT and ∆NMW/NMW is 0.01.
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wage, one needs to know the shape of the function that relates the level of employment
to the level of minimum wages. Instead, equations 3.2 and 3.3 relate the level of
employment to the rate of change of the minimum wage. 15 Another way of seeing
this is to consider a sequence of 4 annual changes to the minimum wage of 0%, +25%,
+25% and 0%. If the predicted retention rate in the second year, when ωt = 0 is E
∗,
then the predicted retention rates in the following 3 years would be E∗, E∗− 0.25βT ,
E∗ − 0.25βT , E∗. In other words, the equation would predict that the retention rate
would fall while the minimum wage was rising, but then would return to its original
level even though the minimum wage was over 56% higher.
3.4 Results
We revisit two papers that are representative of the UK literature on the impact
of the minimum wage on employment. We first present the estimates of the NMW
effect on job retention using the modified DID-style specification of Bryan et al.
(2013) applying the best practices for inference in DID designs and comparing them
with standard inference. We report confidence intervals and MDEs and translate the
estimates into job retention elasticities providing a benchmark with the rest of the
literature. Finally, we calculate employment elasticities for the estimates in Dolton
et al. (2015), a study that examines the impact of the minimum wage on employment
transitions using geographical variation in its bite.
15It would be possible to write down a version of 3.2 that included NMWt as an additional
regressor, but it would not be possible to identify the coefficient on such a variable, as it would be
collinear with the time effects.
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3.4.1 The estimated impact on a NMW uprating on job
retention
Table 3.2 shows estimates of the (weighted) average impact of an NMW uprating on
the probability of remaining employed. We report estimates of βT from equation 3.3
for men in the top panel and for women in the bottom panel. In the first line we
conduct inference using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step estimator; in the other
lines we present estimates of βT that come from estimating equation 3.3 with OLS
and calculating heteroscedasticity- and cluster-robust standard errors and standard
errors with no correction.
Table 3.2: Estimates of Average Impact of a NMW Uprating on Job Retention
Method Std. Errors βT s(βT ) C.I. at 95 % MDE
Men
Two Step - 0.004 0.026 (-0.047 0.056) ±0.073
OLS Cluster Robust 0.013 0.019 (-0.025 0.051) ±0.054
OLS Het. Robust 0.013 0.017 (-0.021 0.046) ±0.049
OLS No Correction 0.013 0.014 (-0.014 0.040) ±0.039
Women
Two Step - -0.001 0.018 (-0.036 0.034) ±0.050
OLS Cluster Robust -0.002 0.009 (-0.019 0.015) ±0.024
OLS Het. Robust -0.002 0.008 (-0.018 0.014) ±0.023
OLS No Correction -0.002 0.007 (-0.016 0.013) ±0.021
∗p < 0.10∗∗p < 0.05∗∗∗p < 0.01
Control variables are age, gender, marital status, highest level of education, region,
ethnicity, number of children, age left education, and whether the respondent has
health problems, industry, public sector, occupation, and tenure. Two-step estimates
are from equation (3.14); OLS estimates are from equation (3.3)
OLS estimates on the micro-data suggest that a NMW uprating increases the proba-
bility of remaining employed. When the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step estimator
is implemented (and controls are included in the specification), then the estimated
impact of an NMW uprating is to increase the job retention rate by 0.4 percentage
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points for men and cut it by 0.1 percentage points for women. 16 17
None of the estimates is statistically different from zero: like the previous UK litera-
ture, we fail to find an impact of the NMW on the probability of remaining employed.
But it is extremely instructive to look at the confidence intervals associated with our
estimates. These reveal two things. First, the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step
standard errors are more than twice as large as the OLS standard errors for women,
and 88% larger for men: this is consistent with our belief that within-cell correlation
in the error terms is an important issue in the DiD. Second, the confidence intervals
in Table 3.2 reveal that large positive and negative impacts of a NMW uprating on
employment would also not fail to be rejected by this data at a significance level
α = 0.05. For example, we cannot reject that an average NMW uprating reduces the
probability of remaining employed by 4.7 percentage points for men, or that it in-
creases the job retention rate by 5.6 percentage points. These confidence intervals are
wide, and illustrate that the data and the research design are not especially helpful in
allowing us to make inferences about the existence of a negative impact of the NMW
on job retention. The corollary of these large standard errors is that the DiD designs
typically used in the UK NMW studies has a low power to detect a plausibly-sized
true NMW effect. Our calculations of the MDEs show that an NMW uprating would
need to decrease (increase) job retention rate for men by 7.3 percentage points to
have an 80 % chance of being detected, and by 5.0 percentage points for women.
16These point estimates of βT are slightly different under the two methods because the coefficient
βT represents the weighted average of the impact all of the NMW upratings on job retention rates,
and the effective weights in this calculation are different when using OLS on the micro-data in
equation 3.3, and when using OLS on cell-level averages in equation 3.12 (see Appendix C1).
17The point estimates in Table 3.2 do not correspond to the results presented in Bryan et al.
(2013). As discussed in Appendix C1, the model estimated in Bryan et al. (2013), corresponding
to our equation 3.1, is exactly identified under the two-step approach. However, we are able to
replicate results in Bryan et al. (2013) to the 2nd decimal point when we also estimate equation 3.1
with OLS, and calculate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors: see Table C3 in Appendix C3.
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3.4.2 The estimated impact on a 1% rise in the NMW on
job retention
The specification in equation 3.3 that estimates the average impact of a NMW up-
rating does not take into account that the size of the up-ratings has varied over time
(see Table 3.1). Table 3.3 therefore presents estimates of the impact of a 1% rise
in the NMW on transitions from employment. We present estimates from equation
3.2 using OLS and the two-step estimator. The point estimates are that a NMW
increase lowers the probability of remaining employed for both men and women, with
a 10 % growth in the minimum wage estimated to reduce the job retention rates
by as much as 10 percentage points for men, and by 1 percentage point for women.
Since the average up-rating size over 2000-2011 is 4.9%, the annual review of the
NMW reduces on average job retention by 4.9 percentage points for men and by 0.4
percentage points for women.
Table 3.3: Estimates of Impact of a 1% rise in the NMW on Job Retention
Method Std. Errors βT s(βT ) C.I. at 95 % MDE
Men
Two Step - -0.010** 0.005 (-0.020 -0.000) ±0.014
OLS Cluster Robust -0.010*** 0.004 (-0.017 -0.002) ±0.010
OLS Het. Robust -0.010*** 0.003 (-0.016 -0.003) ±0.010
OLS No Correction -0.010*** 0.003 (-0.015 -0.005 ) ±0.007
Women
Two Step - -0.001 0.003 (-0.007 0.006) ±0.009
OLS Cluster Robust -0.001 0.002 (-0.005 0.002) ±0.005
OLS Het. Robust -0.001 0.002 (-0.004 0.002) ±0.004
OLS No Correction -0.001 0.001 (-0.004 0.002) ±0.004
∗p < 0.10∗∗p < 0.05∗∗∗p < 0.01
Control variables are age, gender, marital status, highest level of education, region, ethnicity,
number of children, age left education, and whether the respondent has health problems,
industry, public sector, occupation, and tenure. Two-step estimates are from equation
(3.15); OLS estimates are from equation (3.2) and are associated to heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors. NMW in 2000 prices.
As in Table 3.2, the size of the standard errors sharply increases when the Donald
97
and Lang (2007) two-step estimator is implemented: in the specification that includes
controls, the standard error under the two-step is 87% larger than the OLS standard
errors for men, and 127% larger for women. However, the point estimate for men is
large enough to be statistically significant at 5 % significance level. In addition, the
large standard errors obtained through the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step estima-
tor lead to wide confidence intervals: the range of impacts that cannot be rejected
includes that the job retention rate might decline by 20 percentage points, or be close
to no effect, in response to a 10 % NMW rise. The estimated MDEs in column (5)
indicate that one would need a true effect on the probability of remaining employed of
about 14 percentage points for men, and 9 percentage points for women, in response
to a 10 % NMW increase to have 80 % probability of detecting it.
3.4.3 Implied elasticities of job retention and elasticity of
employment
As discussed in Section 3, it is easier to assess whether the point estimates, and
the range of estimates inside the confidence intervals, are large or small if they are
expressed in terms of elasticities that can be compared to those from other studies.
In Tables 3.4, we report the elasticities of job retention to the NMW that are implied
by our estimated coefficients in (respectively) Table 3.2 and 3.3, using the formula
in equation 3.9. The elasticities implied by the point estimates for βT are in the
range of 0.11 and −1.15 for men, and −0.02 and −0.09 for women depending on the
specification. The confidence intervals for these elasticities include large positive and
negative elasticities, especially for men. As a result, the estimated MDEs are very
large. Even if we take the smaller of the 2 MDEs in Table 3.4, our estimates imply
that this DiD design would detect a true effect with 80% probability only if the true
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job retention elasticity was greater than 1.6 for men, and greater than 1 for women.
Table 3.4: Implied elasticities of job retention with respect to the minimum wage,
ηJR
Method Specification ηJR C.I. at 95 % MDE
Men
Two Step Average Uprating 0.11 (-1.19 1.41) ±1.88
Two Step 1% rise -1.15** (-2.25 -0.05) ±1.60
Women
Two Step Average Uprating -0.02 (-0.86 0.83) ±1.23
Two Step 1% rise -0.09 (-0.78 0.60) ±1.00
∗p < 0.10∗∗p < 0.05∗∗∗p < 0.01
Elasticities calculated using equation (3.9). Standard Errors calculated using
the delta method.
For comparison, Table 3.5 reports the range of job retention elasticities observed
in the minimum wage literature that uses individual longitudinal data from the US
and Canada. Unlike some studies that have used aggregate data and find small
insignificant positive effects of the minimum wage on employment (e.g. Card, 1992;
Card and Kruger, 1994, 1995, 2000), studies using individual longitudinal data tend
to find that the minimum wage has a significant detrimental impact on job retention
rates for workers likely to be affected by a minimum wage hike (e.g. young people).
Table 3.5: Estimated elasticities of job retention with respect to the minimum wage,
ηJR, from studies using US and Canadian data
Study Country Group ηJR
Currie and Fallick (1996) USA Workers -0.19 to -0.24
affected by MW
Yuen (2003) CAN Teenagers -0.75 to -0.84
Young Adults -1.23 to -1.77
Neumark and Wascher (2004) USA Teenagers -0.12 to -0.17
Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005) CAN Young Adults -0.33 to -0.54
Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen (2012) USA Young Adults -0.7
Our estimate of βT from equation 3.4 implies a job retention elasticity of -1.15 for
adult men, this is statistically significant at 5 % level. Our finding is close to Yuen
(2003), and larger than what Currie and Fallick (1996), Neumark, Schweitzer, and
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Wascher (2004), Campolieti et al. (2005) and Sabia et al. (2012) obtain for teenagers
and youths. The minimum wage literature in the US and Canada that uses individual
longitudinal data does not apply techniques to account for within-cell shocks or serial
correlation in the treatment status. Despite of following the best practices to conduct
inference in DiD designs, we still find a statistically significant job retention elasticity
that strengthens our idea that research should be cautious to draw the conclusion
that the NMW has no detrimental effect on employment.
We now convert Dolton et al. (2015)’s point estimates of the effect of the NMW on
employment into elasticities and calculate standard errors with the delta method (see
Appendix C2.1-C2.2). Compared to the models of the transition from employment
3.3 and 3.4, the specifications in Dolton et al. (2015) allow for a time-varying impact
of the minimum wage, so we derive the employment elasticity for every year. Table
3.6 presents the employment elasticities using the estimates derived in the static
model of equation 3.5. All the elasticities are negative and imply a reduction of
the employment rate that varies between 0.17 % and 0.83 % in response to a 10 %
increase in the minimum wage.
Although these employment elasticities are relatively small, standard errors are quite
precise and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect at the 5 % level in three
cases (years 2001, 2006, 2009). And again, for the smallest (in magnitude) of our
employment elasticities in Table 3.6, the confidence intervals cannot exclude that
the employment rate declines by 0.8 % or increases by 0.5 % with a 10 % rise in the
minimum wage. The MDEs for the employment elasticities reflect the relatively small
standard errors. The minimum size of the employment elasticity we would have 80 %
power to detect is around ±0.1 that corresponds to a 1 % change in the employment
in response to a 10 % increase in the NMW.
Table 3.7 reports the employment elasticities derived from the dynamic model 3.6.
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Table 3.6: Employment elasticity with respect to the the year t minimum wage
uprating. Estimates of η¯ER(t) derived from the static model of equation 3.5.
t η¯ER(t) sη¯ER(t) C.I. at 95 % MDE
1999 -0.054* 0.032 (-0.117 0.009) ±0.091
2000 -0.041 0.032 (-0.103 0.022) ±0.091
2001 -0.074** 0.033 (-0.140 -0.008) ±0.095
2002 -0.055* 0.033 (-0.120 0.009) ±0.094
2003 -0.023 0.034 (-0.090 0.045) ±0.098
2004 -0.017 0.036 (-0.087 0.053) ±0.102
2005 -0.054 0.037 (-0.127 0.018) ±0.105
2006 -0.077** 0.038 (-0.152 -0.003) ±0.108
2007 -0.049 0.037 (-0.122 0.024) ±0.106
2008 -0.035 0.037 (-0.107 0.038) ±0.105
2009 -0.083** 0.036 (-0.155 -0.012) ±0.103
2010 -0.051 0.037 (-0.124 0.023) ±0.106
∗p < 0.10∗∗p < 0.05∗∗∗p < 0.001
Standard errors for the employment elasticity are calculated as
sη¯ER(t) = K¯t ·
√
σˆ2θ0 + σˆ
2
θt
, assuming σθ0θt = 0
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Compared to the static model this specification accounts for the autoregressive struc-
ture of employment. Although the employment elasticities are small in the range of
-0.086 and no effect they are never statistically significant at conventional levels. This
is because standard errors are less precise in the dynamic model than in the static
model and produce wider confidence intervals. Taking the estimate with the lowest
standard error (i.e. 2000), the confidence interval includes a range of employment
elasticities that include a reduction by 1.4 % or a rise by 0.8 % in the employment
rate with a 10 % growth in the NMW. MDEs are quite large and indicate that we
would detect a true effect with 80 % probability only if the true employment elasticity
was greater than 0.15.
A note of caution should be done regarding the interpretation of the confidence in-
tervals and MDEs in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7. We calculate standard errors assuming
that the parameters involved in the estimation of the elasticities are uncorrelated. In
Appendix C2.1 and C2.2 we relax this assumption and set several degrees of corre-
lation between the parameters to calculate standard errors, confidence intervals and
MDEs of the elasticity in 2001, one of the years in which we found a statistically
significant elasticity at conventional level. Regardless of the degree of correlation the
2001 elasticity derived from the static model is always statistically significant at 10
% level. In the dynamic model we do not reject the null hypothesis of no effect in
most of the cases but the confidence intervals can be very large.
In Table 3.8 we report the range of the employment elasticities recovered in studies
of the USA literature on the minimum wage. Despite the considerable number of
studies, the debate on the employment effect of the minimum wage has not reached
an unanimous consensus. Some scholars find employment elasticities in the range of
[-0.1; -0.3] as in the series of studies reported in the earliest minimum wage review
(Brown, Gilroy, & Kohen, 1983), others point out that some specifications show no
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Table 3.7: Employment elasticity with respect to the the year t minimum wage
uprating. Estimates of η¯ER(t) derived from the dynamic model in equation C2.2.
t η¯ER(t) sη¯ER(t) C.I. at 95 % MDE
1999 -0.019 0.056 (-0.129 0.091) ±0.159
2000 -0.029 0.054 (-0.136 0.077) ±0.154
2001 -0.082 0.059 (-0.197 0.033) ±0.166
2002 -0.059 0.057 (-0.170 0.051) ±0.160
2003 -0.016 0.063 (-0.140 0.108) ±0.179
2004 -0.023 0.070 (-0.160 0.114) ±0.198
2005 -0.032 0.065 (-0.159 0.095) ±0.184
2006 -0.063 0.068 (-0.196 0.071) ±0.193
2007 -0.029 0.070 (-0.167 0.108) ±0.199
2008 0.000 0.065 (-0.128 0.128) ±0.185
2009 -0.086 0.069 (-0.221 0.049) ±0.195
2010 -0.030 0.073 (-0.174 0.113) ±0.208
∗p < 0.10∗∗p < 0.05∗∗∗p < 0.001
Standard errors for the employment elasticity are calcu-
lated as sη¯ER(t) =
K¯t
1−γˆ ·
√
σˆ2θ0 + σˆ
2
θt
+ ( θˆ0+θˆt1−γˆ )
2σˆ2γ , assuming
σθ0θt = 0, σθ0γ = 0 and σθtγ = 0
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detrimental effect of the minimum wage on employment. The elasticities derived from
Dolton et al. (2015) posit between -0.1 and no effect leading to conclude that if any
the minimum wage in the UK has had a modest impact compared to in the USA.
However, it is important to note that the literature in the USA has focused on the
employment rate of groups likely to be at the bottom of the earning distribution such
as teenagers and low-wage industries (e.g fast-food and retailer sectors). In the UK
a study on a low-wage sector, the residential care homes industry, finds elasticities
in the range of -0.15 to -0.40 (Machin et al., 2003), although a later paper finds less
robust evidence (Machin & Wilson, 2004). The design in Dolton et al. (2015) correctly
estimates the impact of the NMW on employment for the working age population
but ignore the fact that the effect is possibly larger for groups likely affected by the
minimum wage.
Table 3.8: Estimated employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage,
ηER, from studies using US data
Study Group ηJR
Brown et al. (1983) Teenagers -0.23 to -0.02
Card (1992) Teenagers -0.06 to 0.19
Neumark and Wascher (1992) Teenagers -0.2 to -0.1
Young Adults (15-24) -0.2 to -0.15
Neumark and Wascher (2004) Teenagers -0.24 to -0.18
Young Adults (15-24) -0.16 to -0.13
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) Low Wage Sector -0.21 to 0.06
Employees
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) Teenagers -0.12 to 0.05
Neumark, Salas, and Wascher (2014) Restaurant Employees -0.15 & -0.05
and Teenagers
Meer and West (2015) Working Age (15-59) -0.19 to 0.01
Bazen and Marimoutou (2016) Teenagers -0.43 to -0.13
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusions
The UK is unusual for the fact that economic research on the impact of the NMW
on employment has played a decisive role in the setting of the NMW each year. Our
concern is that too much weight has been placed on a body of research that has mostly
failed to reject the null hypothesis that “the NMW has no effect on employment”:
policy-makers seem to have wrongly interpreted p-values as telling us how likely it
is that the NMW does have an adverse effect on employment, and have not paid
attention to the range of values that would also not be rejected. And this concern is
compounded by the fact that much of the UK literature has employed difference-in-
difference (DiD) designs, even though there are significant challenges in conducting
inference appropriately in such designs, meaning that the existing research has likely
under-stated the statistical imprecision of its key parameter estimates.
In this paper, we re-evaluate the UK research on the employment effects of the mini-
mum wage following two common approaches in the literature. Our study first follows
Bryan et al. (2013), one of the most recent and comprehensive reports commissioned
on the NMW effects on employment and, as in the UK NMW literature, we also
cannot reject the null that the NMW up-ratings had no impact on job retention.
However, when we apply the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step estimator to conduct
correct inference, the range of effects that also cannot be rejected is extremely large,
and include large positive and negative values of the NMW impacts on employment.
Moreover, using Bloom (1995)’s minimum detectable effects, we find that the DiD
design typically used in the literature has low power to detect a real NMW impact.
For example, in our preferred specification, one would need that the job retention
rate in reality falls by 16 % in response to a 10 % NMW rise to be able to detect it
with 80 % probability using the data and research design typically used in the UK
work. This impact would correspond to a job retention elasticity with respect to the
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minimum wage of about −1.2. In the second part of our analysis we use Dolton et
al. (2015)’s approach that exploits geographical variation in the impact of the NMW
and calculate employment elasticities. In the preferred dynamic specification the em-
ployment elasticities vary between -0.083 and 0. However, we find again relatively
large minimum detectable effects that point to low power of the design. Indeed, one
would need a fall in employment of more than 1% in response to a 10 % NMW rise
to detect the NMW effect with 80 % probability.
Our study raises concerns for the routine application of a DiD designs when assessing
the impact of the NMW on employment. Although we also do not find any statisti-
cal significant impact, the confidence intervals we obtain suggest that the standard
research design used in the assessment of the UK’s NMW is not very informative.
In turn, this casts doubt on the consensus that the UK NMW does not harm em-
ployment. We therefore recommend a reconsideration of the combined use of a DiD
designs with existing UK data sources when evaluating the NMW impact on em-
ployment. Better evidence may come from the large recent change occurred with the
introduction of the National Living Wage but it would be unfortunate if it turns out
to have deleterious effects on employment.
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Appendix
C1 Inference in Difference-in-Differences with
Grouped Errors
A broad literature has raised concerns about the accuracy of the inference in DiD
designs when using the na¨ıve estimates of the standard errors provided by OLS.
The first concern relates to the grouped error structure. In DiD designs, the error term
igts is unlikely to be iid, because an individual may have unobservable characteristics
that are correlated with other individuals of the same group, or may be affected by
common group shocks. In the case of these studies of the minimum wage, members
of the treatment group are all located at the bottom of the wage distribution, and so
it is highly plausible that they may have some common unobservable characteristics
(low ability, low skills, etc.) or are influenced by the same economic shocks. A
comprehensive specification of equation (3.1) which includes common group shocks
ϕgts is:
yigts = δts + αgt + βgtdgsωt + x
′
igtsγ + ϕgts + ξigts (3.10)
i = 1, ..., N ; g = C,B, T,A; s = 0, 1; t = 2000, ..., 2011
and igts = ϕgts + ξigts.
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A well-known result is that, in designs where the errors are within-group correlated
and where a variable of interest does not vary within the group, the conventional
OLS estimates of standard errors are seriously downward biased: this produces t-
statistics that are too large and, accordingly, leads analysts to over-reject the null
hypothesis of no treatment effect (Moulton, 1990). To the best of our knowledge,
though, none of the research cited in Section 2 addresses this issue: most studies
use heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, but do not allow for any dependence
between different individuals.
Various standard error corrections have been proposed to account for the common
group structure in the random disturbances igts and thus produce tests of the correct
size: these include a parametric adjustment using intra-class correlations (Moulton,
1990), the Liang and Zeger (1986) generalization of the White (1980) heteroskedas-
tic robust covariance matrix, a feasible GLS estimator (Hansen, 2007), and methods
based on the bootstrap (Cameron et al., 2008). However, many of these techniques
lead to t-statistics for the null hypothesis of no treatment effect that are asymptoti-
cally normal distributed only as the number of groups tend to infinity (e.g. Donald
and Lang (2007), Angrist and Pischke (2008), Cameron et al. (2008), Brewer et al.
(2013)). When the number of groups is small - and we have only 4 - the critical
values of the asymptotic normal distribution will be a poor approximation to the
critical values for the Wald tests, and using critical values from the standard normal
distribution when the number of groups is small will lead us to over-reject the null
hypothesis. But a method that does lead to Wald tests with a known distribution in
cases with few clusters is a two-step estimator: under specific circumstances where the
common group shock ϕgts is normal, homoscedastic and uncorrelated between groups
and over time, Donald and Lang (2007) show this two-step estimator produces tests
of the correct size.
The two-step estimator consists in retrieving estimates in two stages: in the first step,
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the dependent variable is regressed on dummies that identify cell membership and
all the variables which vary within cells. In the second stage, the set of parameters
associated with the cell membership are regressed on the variables which do not vary
within cells. In the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step estimator, the concept of cell
or cluster is essential: errors within a cell are allowed to be correlated, but shocks
between cells are assumed to be independent.
In our study, we define a cell as the interaction of group, year and transition-type,
giving us 96 cells (4 groups, 12 years of data, and 2 transition types). The first stage
regression is then:
yic = x
′
icγ +
96∑
c=1
Icµc + ic (3.11)
i = 1, ..., N ; c = 1, ..., 96
where Ic is a dummy variable which identifies the c-th cell, and x are the controls
that vary within-cell. 18
In the second stage, the coefficients associated with the cell membership dummies µc
are regressed on the cell-invariant variables. In our example, this second step is:
µˆc = δts + αgt + βgtdc + c (3.12)
c = 1, ..., 96; t = 2000, ..., 2011
where dc is a dummy indicating whether the c-th cell is affected by a minimum wage
uprating.
As Donald and Lang (2007) observe, standard errors cannot be estimated with this
approach for a two-by-two DiD design, as the second step is an exactly-identified
18All the control variables x in the equation 3.10 vary within-cell.
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regression, with 4 coefficients (2 time effects, 1 group effect and 1 policy effect) being
estimated from 4 data points. Clearly, the same is true for other types of DiD where
the second step is an exactly-identified regression. What might not be immediately
clear is that this situation also holds when we apply the two-step to the unrestricted
equation 3.10. The argument runs as follows: in equation 3.10, identification of the
impact of the NMW arises because, in every year, we observe transitions that either
do or do not span an uprating, and where these transitions can come from 1 of 4
groups, three of whom are deemed to be affected by the uprating (but in different
ways). Accordingly, each year of data effectively provides us with a 4-group, 2-period
DiD (if we understand the 2 periods to refer to whether or not a transition spans
an uprating) where the policy affects 3 groups in the second period with impacts
that are allowed to be different. This means that applying the two-step method to
such data would lead to a second step regression with zero degrees of freedom (with
2 time effects, 3 group effects and 3 policy effects estimated from 8 data-points).
Accordingly, equation 3.10, which is the main specification in Bryan et al. (2013),
and which allows both for the group effects to be different in each year and for the
impact of each year’s uprating on the three treated groups to be different, would
also give a second-step regression in equation 3.12 with zero degrees of freedom (it
is equivalent to estimating 10 separate, exactly-identified, DiDs, where each DiD is a
4-group, 2-period DiD that is producing 8 coefficients). To address this problem, we
make two restrictions to the (overly) flexible model in equation 3.10 so as to be able
to undertake inference, notably: each group has a constant effect on job retention
over time (so we estimate αg rather than αgt, and the impact of an NMW uprating
effect is constant over time (but different for each group) (so we estimate βg rather
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than βgt). This gives us the following:
yigts = δts + αg + βgdgs + x
′
igtsγ + igts (3.13)
i = 1, ..., N ; g = C,B, T,A; t = 2000, ..., 2011
and the second stage is:
µˆc = δts + αg + βgdc + c (3.14)
c = 1, ..., 80; t = 2000, ..., 2011
βT can then be interpreted as the (weighted) average impact of a NMW uprating on
job retention for the treatment group.
For the variant where we estimate the impact of a 1% rise in the NMW on job
retention, the amended model is:
yigts = δts + αg + βgdgsωt + x
′
igstγ + igst
i = 1, ..., N ; g = C,B, T,A; t = 2000, ..., 2011
and the second stage in the Donald and Lang two-step estimator is:
µˆc = δts + αg + βgdcωt + c (3.15)
c = 1, ..., 80; t = 2000, ..., 2011
where βT is the (weighted) average effect of a 1% NMW rise on the probability of
remaining employed.
A second concern about inference in DiD studies, as initially noted by Bertrand et al.
(2004), is that the level of uncertainty surrounding the estimated policy effect in DiD
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designs will likely be increased by positive serial correlation in the group-time shocks,
as the variable of interest in DiD designs is itself highly serially-correlated. Put more
directly, if the group-time shocks ϕgts exhibit positive serial correlation that is ignored
in estimation, then the resulting estimates of the standard errors will likely be biased
downwards; it is for this reason that the Bertrand et al. (2004) recommendation is
that analysts NOT cluster errors at the level of the group-time interaction, as doing
so leads to incorrect inference if there is serial correlation in the ϕgts. In principle,
this could cause a problem for our approach based on the Donald and Lang (2007)
two-step, as we assume that each cell, given by a group-time-span interaction, is
independent of the others. But we test for serial correlation by estimating a first
order auto-regressive model of the residuals by group. The results are shown in
Table C4 (Appendix C3), which displays the first order auto-regressive coefficients
from our estimates of equation (3.2). Residuals for the treatment group exhibit small,
negative degree of serial correlation for men, although that for women is larger, at
0.40 (the confidence intervals for both span zero). However, our research design is
much less subject to problems caused by positive serial correlation in the group-time
shocks because our variable of interest is negatively serially correlated, as it turns on
and off repeatedly (recall our analysis uses data that covers 12 years, within each of
which we observe two 6-month transitions that span an uprating, and two 6-month
transitions that do not).
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C2 Derivation of formulas for the elasticity of
employment with respect to the minimum
wage
C2.1 Static Model
The static model in Dolton et al. (2015) is
log(Ejt) = pi0 + Aj + pit
t∑
k=1999
Ik + θ0Kjt + θt
t∑
k=1999
IkKjt + x
′
jtρ+ jt
t = 1997, ..., 2010; j = 1, ..., 138
Since the dependent variable Ejt is expressed in log- terms and Kjt =
NMWt
med(wagejt)
, the
partial derivative of Ejt with respect to NMWt is
∂Ejt
∂NMWt
=
θ0 + θt
med(wagejt)
· Ejt
Plugging this expression in the definition of employment elasticity
ηER(t) =
∂Ejt
∂NMWt
· NMWt
Ejt
=
(θ0 + θt)Ejt
med(wagejt)
· NMWt
Ejt
=
θ0 + θt
med(wagejt)
·NMWt
= (θ0 + θt)Kjt
The employment elasticity η¯ER(t) at the median of the wage distribution of employees
in working age med(waget) is
η¯ER(t) = (θ0 + θt)K¯t
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where K¯t =
NMWt
med(waget)
The variance of η¯ER(t) is
V ar(η¯ER(t)) = V ar((θ0 + θt)K¯t)
= (
∂η¯ER(t)
∂θ0
)2σ2θ0 + (
∂η¯ER(t)
∂θt
)2σ2θt + 2
∂η¯ER(t)
∂θ0
∂η¯ER(t)
∂θt
σθ0θt
= (K¯t)
2 · [σ2θ0 + σ2θt + 2σθ0θt ]
Table C1: Employment elasticity with respect to the the year 2001 minimum wage
uprating. Estimates of η¯ER(2001) derived from the static model of equation 3.5.
η¯ER(2001) A σθ0θ2001 = A ∗ sθ0sθ2001 sη¯ER(2001) CIs MDE
-0.074** 0 0 0.033 (-0.140 -0.008) ±0.095
-0.074*** -0.6 -0.0025 0.021 (-0.116 -0.032) ±0.060
-0.074*** -0.3 -0.0013 0.028 (-0.129 -0.019) ±0.080
-0.074** -0.1 -0.0004 0.032 (-0.136 -0.012) ±0.090
-0.074** 0.1 0.0004 0.035 (-0.143 -0.005) ±0.100
-0.074* 0.3 0.0013 0.038 (-0.149 0.001) ±0.108
-0.074* 0.6 0.0025 0.042 (-0.157 0.009) ±0.120
∗p < 0.10∗∗p < 0.05∗∗∗p < 0.001
Standard errors for the employment elasticity are calculated as
sη¯ER(2001) = K¯2001 ·
√
s2θ0 + s
2
θ2001
+ 2σθ0θ2001
The standard error of η¯ER(t) sη¯ER(t) depends on σθ0θt , the covariance of θ0 and θt.
Assuming σθ0θt = 0 the estimate of sη¯ER(t) is
sη¯ER(t) = K¯t ·
√
s2θ0 + s
2
θt
where sˆ2θ0 and sˆ
2
θt
are the standard errors of θ0 and θt. The direction of the bias of
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sη¯ER(t) depends on the sign of σθ0θt . sη¯ER(t) is overestimated if σθ0θt is negative and
underestimated if the covariance of θ0 and θt is positive. In Table C1 we show how
standard errors, confidence intervals and MDEs of the 2001 elasticity change varying
the correlation between θ0 and θ2001 .
C2.2 Dynamic Model
The dynamic model in Dolton et al. (2015) is
log(Ejt) = γEjt−1 + pi0 + Aj + pit
t∑
k=1999
Ik + θ0Kjt + θt
t∑
k=1999
IkKjt + x
′
jtρ+ jt
t = 1997, ..., 2010; j = 1, ..., 138
where Ejt is the employment of area j.
In the dynamic model the minimum wage at time t has an effect on employment that
stretches over time. The partial derivative of Ejt+s with respect to NMWt is
∂Ejt+s
∂NMWt
= γs
θ0 + θt
med(wagejt)
· Ejt+s
s = 0, ...,∞
and the employment elasticity ηt+sER(t) at time t+ s with respect to NMWt is
ηt+sER(t) =
∂Ejt+s
∂NMWt
· NMWt
Ejt+s
= γs
(θ0 + θt)Ejt+s
med(wagejt)
· NMWt
Ejt+s
= γs
θ0 + θt
med(wagejt)
·NMWt = γs(θ0 + θt)Kjt
s = 0, ...,∞
The employment elasticity η¯t+sER(t) at the median of the wage distribution of employees
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in working age med(waget) is
η¯t+sER(t) = γ
s(θ0 + θt)K¯t
The total employment elasticity η¯ER(t) with respect to the minimum wage at time t
is the sum of the employment elasticities over time
η¯ER(t) =
∞∑
s=0
η¯t+sER(t)
=
∞∑
s=0
γs(θ0 + θt)K¯t
= (θ0 + θt)K¯t
∞∑
s=0
γi
=
θ0 + θt
1− γ K¯t
The variance of η¯ER(t) is
V ar(η¯ER(t)) = V ar(
θ0 + θt
1− γ · K¯t) = (
∂η¯ER(t)
∂θ0
)2σ2θ0 + (
∂η¯ER(t)
∂θt
)2σ2θt + (
∂η¯ER(t)
∂γ
)2σ2γ
+ 2
∂η¯ER(t)
∂θ0
∂η¯ER(t)
∂θt
σθ0θt + 2
∂η¯ER(t)
∂θ0
∂η¯ER(t)
∂γ
σθ0γ + 2
∂η¯ER(t)
∂θt
∂η¯ER(t)
∂γ
σθtγ
= (
K¯t
1− γ )
2 · σ2θ0 + (
K¯t
1− γ )
2 · σ2θt + (
θ0 + θt
(1− γ)2 · K¯t)
2 · σ2γ
+ 2(
K¯t
1− γ )
2σθ0θt − 2
K¯t
2
(1− γ)3 (θ0 + θt)σθ0γ − 2
K¯t
2
(1− γ)3 (θ0 + θt)σθtγ
The standard error of η¯ER(t) depends on σθ0θt , σθ0γ and σθtγ the covariances between
θ0, θt and γ. Assuming that σθ0θt = 0, σθ0γ = 0 and σθtγ = 0 the standard error of
η¯ER(t) is
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sη¯ER(t) =
K¯t
1− γˆ ·
√
s2θ0 + s
2
θt
+ (
θˆ0 + θˆt
1− γˆ )
2s2γ
where θˆ0, θˆt, γˆ are the estimates of θ0, θt, γ and sθ0 , sθt and sγ are the standard errors
of θ0, θt and γ. In Table C2 we report how standard errors, confidence intervals and
MDEs of the 2001 elasticity change when we relax the assumption of no correlation
between θ0, θ2001 and γ .
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Table C2: Employment elasticity with respect to the the year 2001 minimum wage
uprating. Estimates of η¯ER(2002) derived from the dynamic model of equation 3.5.
η¯ER(2001) σθ0θ2001 σθ0γ σθ2001γ sη¯ER(2001) CIs MDE
-0.082 0 0 0 0.059 (-0.197 0.033) ±0.166
-0.082** -0.0006 -0.005 -0.004 0.039 (-0.159 -0.005 ) ±0.111
-0.082 -0.0006 -0.005 0.004 0.053 (-0.185 0.021) ±0.149
-0.082 -0.0006 0.005 -0.004 0.055 (-0.190 0.025) ±0.156
-0.082 -0.0006 0.005 0.004 0.060 (-0.210 0.046) ±0.185
-0.082 0.0006 -0.005 -0.004 0.051 (-0.182 0.018) ±0.145
-0.082 0.0006 -0.005 0.004 0.062 (-0.204 0.040) ±0.176
-0.082 0.0006 0.005 -0.004 0.064 (-0.207 0.043) ±0.182
-0.082 0.0006 0.005 0.004 0.073 (-0.225 0.061) ±0.207
-0.082 0.006 -0.005 -0.004 0.086 (-0.252 0.088) ±0.246
-0.082 0.006 -0.005 0.004 0.093 (-0.265 0.101) ±0.265
-0.082 0.006 0.005 -0.004 0.095 (-0.268 0.104) ±0.269
-0.082 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.101 (-0.280 0.116) ±0.286
∗p < 0.10∗∗p < 0.05∗∗∗p < 0.001
Standard errors for the employment elasticity are calculated as
sη¯ER(2001) =
K¯2001
1−γˆ ·
√
s2θ0 + s
2
θ2001
+ ( θˆ0+θˆ20011−γˆ )
2s2γ + 2σθ0θ2001 − 2 θˆ0+θˆ20011−γˆ σθ0γ − 2 θˆ0+θˆ20011−γˆ σθ2001γ
where σθ0θ2001 = A ∗ sθ0 ∗ sθ2001 , σθ0γ = B ∗ sθ0 ∗ sγ , σθtγ = C ∗ sθ0 ∗ sγ ,
A = −0.01, 0.01, 0.1;B,C = −0.1, 0.1
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C3 Supplementary results
Table C3: Replication of impact of NMW on job retention presented in Bryan et al.
(2013)
Bryan et al. Replication Bryan et al. Replication
Year t Men Men Women Women
2000 -0.040 -0.040 0.012 0.013
2001 -0.177** -0.179** -0.028 -0.028
2002 0.069 0.072 0.018 0.018
2003 -0.106 -0.105 -0.010 -0.009
2004 -0.033 -0.074 -0.010 -0.002
2005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.016 -0.016
2006 0.103** 0.104** 0.001 0.001
2007 0.057 0.056 0.037 0.037
2008 0.098* 0.095* -0.017 -0.016
2009 0.009 0.010 0.037 0.037
∗p < 0.10∗∗p < 0.05∗∗∗p < 0.001
Control variables used in the DIDs model are age, gender, marital status, highest level
of education, region, ethnicity, number of children, age left education, and whether
the respondent has health problems, industry, public sector, occupation, and tenure.
Bryan et al. (2013) results are from their Tables 7-8
Model that identifies the uprating effect is yigts = δts + αgt + βgtdgs + x
′
igtsγ + igts
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Table C4: Estimates of first-order autoregression coefficient of the residuals from
equation (3.2).
Autoregressive Coefficients
ρˆC -0.12 -0.24 0.34 0.44
ρˆT -0.03 -0.17 0.32 0.40
ρˆA 0.28 0.23 0.49 0.51
ρˆB 0.26 0.19 0.31 0.43
Gender Men Men Women Women
Controls No Yes No Yes
We estimated the model gt = ρggt−1 + νt
ρC is the autoregressive coefficient for control group,
ρT for treatment group, ρA for Above NMWt group,
ρB for Below NMWt group
∗p < 0.10∗∗p < 0.05∗∗∗p < 0.001
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Conclusions
This thesis sheds light on important aspects of three public policies that are among
the cornerstones of the UK welfare system: the Winter Fuel Payment (WFP), the
Housing Benefits (HB) and the National Minimum Wage (NMW). In the case of
the WFP, we examine whether it has any impact on its ultimate goal: the health of
elderly people. For Housing Benefits, we investigate the response of the rental market
to a cut in housing subsidies. Studying the NMW, we offer a re-assessment of the
literature on the effects of the minimum wage on employment.
In Chapter 1 we employ a regression discontinuity design exploiting the 60 year
old eligibility cut-off of the WFP. We estimate the local average treatment effect
of the WFP on health outcomes including self-reports of chest infection, measured
hypertension and fibrinogen and C-reactive proteine, two markers of infection and
inflammation. Overall, the Winter Fuel Payment does appear to have had some
health benefit among those just eligible. We find a robust and statistically significant
reduction in the incidence of high concentration of fibrinogen. The point estimates
for all other markers point to health benefits but they are less precisely estimated. In
terms of reduction in the incidence of our measures of illness for people in the early
sixties, this varies between 5 % for hypertension and 44 % for fibrinogen. Using a
health index that combines our illness markers, we find particularly large effects for
low education individuals. Although we could estimate the health benefits only for
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people at the 60 year old eligibility cut-off, our findings are relevant from a policy
perspective. Following the recent increase in the Female State Pension Age, the
eligibility age for the WFP is now 64. Therefore the health benefits documented
in Chapter 1 will have been eliminated by these increases in the eligibility age. In
light of our findings we think that policy makers should be sensitive to ensure a
warm indoor environment to elderly people. Adequate indoor heating may prevent
illnesses reducing the pressure on the healthcare system through a fall in the number
of hospitalizations and visits to physicians.
In Chapter 2 we exploit an exogenous cut in housing subsidies in the UK as a quasi-
experimental design to estimate the incidence of housing subsidies on subsidised and
unsubsidised tenants. The expectation of the UK government at the time of the
reform was that rents would fall, benefiting all tenants. However, the reform of
the housing subsidy did not affect rental market prices, and so the incidence fell
almost entirely on tenants. This finding may be explained by a series of factors.
Among them, there are the nominal rigidity of rents in the short term and the general
conditions of the housing market. In recent years we observed an expansion of the
demand in the private rental market due to an increase in number of unsubsidised
tenants and new subsidy recipients. The bargaining power of tenants might be low if
landlords could choose among a large pool of potential tenants. Policies that support
tenants in the process of the rental agreement or incentives to supply affordable
houses in areas of high demand could prevent that the incidence of housing subsidies
falls on tenants.
In the final Chapter we make a point on the NMW. The conduct of the NMW in
the UK has been evidence-based, and the research has broadly concluded that the
NMW has no detrimental effect on employment. We re-evaluate this literature in
light of two concerns. The first concern is that the literature has mostly failed to
reject the null hypothesis of “no effect on employment” but has never commented
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on the range of values that lie within the confidence intervals. The second concern
is that the studies have employed a difference-in-differences design, although there
are challenges in conducting inference with such designs and this can lead to low
power of the designs. In our re-analysis we find that the data are consistent with
both large negative and small positive effects of the UK National Minimum Wage
on employment. Minimum Detectable Effects also show that difference-in-difference
designs used in the literature have low power to detect a real NMW impact. Our
findings cast doubt on the consensus that the UK NMW does not harm employment
and suggest a reconsideration of the combined use of difference-in-differences design
and the existing data in evaluating the NMW effects.
Overall we think we have provided some useful insights on three UK public policies:
the Winter Fuel Payment, the Housing Benefits and the National Minimum Wage.
We indeed offer policy makers important elements to assess whether the policies have
the expected effects and inputs for policy reforms.
Three useful considerations for policy makers can be inferred from this thesis. First,
policy makers should clearly outline the goals of policies and conduct a systematic
evaluation of the achievements of these policies. If the policy produces unexpected
consequences, policy makers should promptly set out appropriate changes. The sec-
ond suggestion is that policy makers should consider all the environmental conditions.
Similar policies could have very different effects in different contexts. The third con-
sideration is that policy makers should monitor the power of the research design.
They should focus more on the size of the policy effect rather than whether the effect
is statistical significant.
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